[PATCH RESEND v3 bpf-next 01/14] bpf: introduce BPF token object
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
toke at redhat.com
Thu Jul 6 11:32:42 UTC 2023
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko at gmail.com> writes:
> Having it as a separate single-purpose FS seems cleaner, because we
> have use cases where we'd have one BPF FS instance created for a
> container by our container manager, and then exposing a few separate
> tokens with different sets of allowed functionality. E.g., one for
> main intended workload, another for some BPF-based observability
> tools, maybe yet another for more heavy-weight tools like bpftrace for
> extra debugging. In the debugging case our container infrastructure
> will be "evacuating" any other workloads on the same host to avoid
> unnecessary consequences. The point is to not disturb
> workload-under-human-debugging as much as possible, so we'd like to
> keep userns intact, which is why mounting extra (more permissive) BPF
> token inside already running containers is an important consideration.
This example (as well as Yafang's in the sibling subthread) makes it
even more apparent to me that it would be better with a model where the
userspace policy daemon can just make decisions on each call directly,
instead of mucking about with different tokens with different embedded
permissions. Why not go that route (see my other reply for details on
what I mean)?
-Toke
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