[PATCH] kernel/sys.c: fix and improve control flow in __sys_setres[ug]id()

Ondrej Mosnacek omosnace at redhat.com
Wed Feb 15 13:18:07 UTC 2023


1. First determine if CAP_SET[UG]ID is required and only then call
   ns_capable_setid(), to avoid bogus LSM (SELinux) denials.
2. Do the capability check before prepare_creds() as an optimization.
3. Check for a no-op early as an optimization.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat.com>
---
 kernel/sys.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 5fd54bf0e8867..6fd88686cd06f 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -664,6 +664,7 @@ long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
 	struct cred *new;
 	int retval;
 	kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid;
+	bool ruid_new, euid_new, suid_new;
 
 	kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid);
 	keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid);
@@ -678,25 +679,29 @@ long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
 	if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(ksuid))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	old = current_cred();
+
+	/* check for no-op */
+	if ((ruid == (uid_t) -1 || uid_eq(kruid, old->uid)) &&
+	    (euid == (uid_t) -1 || (uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) &&
+				    uid_eq(keuid, old->fsuid))) &&
+	    (suid == (uid_t) -1 || uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid)))
+		return 0;
+
+	ruid_new = ruid != (uid_t) -1        && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) &&
+		   !uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid);
+	euid_new = euid != (uid_t) -1        && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid) &&
+		   !uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->suid);
+	suid_new = suid != (uid_t) -1        && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->uid) &&
+		   !uid_eq(ksuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid);
+	if ((ruid_new || euid_new || suid_new) &&
+	    !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	new = prepare_creds();
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	old = current_cred();
-
-	retval = -EPERM;
-	if (!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
-		if (ruid != (uid_t) -1        && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) &&
-		    !uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid))
-			goto error;
-		if (euid != (uid_t) -1        && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid) &&
-		    !uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->suid))
-			goto error;
-		if (suid != (uid_t) -1        && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->uid) &&
-		    !uid_eq(ksuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid))
-			goto error;
-	}
-
 	if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
 		new->uid = kruid;
 		if (!uid_eq(kruid, old->uid)) {
@@ -761,6 +766,7 @@ long __sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
 	struct cred *new;
 	int retval;
 	kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid;
+	bool rgid_new, egid_new, sgid_new;
 
 	krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid);
 	kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid);
@@ -773,23 +779,28 @@ long __sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
 	if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(ksgid))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	old = current_cred();
+
+	/* check for no-op */
+	if ((rgid == (gid_t) -1 || gid_eq(krgid, old->gid)) &&
+	    (egid == (gid_t) -1 || (gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) &&
+				    gid_eq(kegid, old->fsgid))) &&
+	    (sgid == (gid_t) -1 || gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid)))
+		return 0;
+
+	rgid_new = rgid != (gid_t) -1        && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) &&
+		   !gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid);
+	egid_new = egid != (gid_t) -1        && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) &&
+		   !gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid);
+	sgid_new = sgid != (gid_t) -1        && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) &&
+		   !gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid);
+	if ((rgid_new || egid_new || sgid_new) &&
+	    !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	new = prepare_creds();
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	old = current_cred();
-
-	retval = -EPERM;
-	if (!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) {
-		if (rgid != (gid_t) -1        && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) &&
-		    !gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid))
-			goto error;
-		if (egid != (gid_t) -1        && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) &&
-		    !gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid))
-			goto error;
-		if (sgid != (gid_t) -1        && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) &&
-		    !gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid))
-			goto error;
-	}
 
 	if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
 		new->gid = krgid;
-- 
2.39.1



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