[PATCH v8 9/9] landlock: Document IOCTL support

Mickaël Salaün mic at digikod.net
Wed Dec 13 11:25:15 UTC 2023


On Fri, Dec 08, 2023 at 04:51:21PM +0100, Günther Noack wrote:
> In the paragraph above the fallback logic, use the shorter phrasing
> from the landlock(7) man page.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack at google.com>
> ---
>  Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 119 ++++++++++++++++++++---
>  1 file changed, 104 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> 

> +Restricting IOCTL commands
> +--------------------------
> +
> +When the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL`` access right is handled, Landlock will

I only use "right" (instead of "access right") when LANDLOCK_ACCESS_*
precede to avoid repetition.

> +restrict the invocation of IOCTL commands.  However, to *permit* these IOCTL

This patch introduces the "permit*" wording instead of the currently
used "allowed", which is inconsistent.

> +commands again, some of these IOCTL commands are then granted through other,
> +preexisting access rights.
> +
> +For example, consider a program which handles ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL`` and
> +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE``.  The program *permits*
> +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE`` on a file ``foo.log``.
> +
> +By virtue of granting this access on the ``foo.log`` file, it is now possible to
> +use common and harmless IOCTL commands which are useful when reading files, such
> +as ``FIONREAD``.
> +
> +On the other hand, if the program permits ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL`` on
> +another file, ``FIONREAD`` will not work on that file when it is opened.  As
> +soon as ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE`` is *handled* in the ruleset, the IOCTL
> +commands affected by it can not be reenabled though ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL``
> +any more, but are then governed by ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE``.
> +
> +The following table illustrates how IOCTL attempts for ``FIONREAD`` are
> +filtered, depending on how a Landlock ruleset handles and permits the
> +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL`` and ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE`` access rights:
> +
> ++------------------------+-------------+-------------------+-------------------+
> +|                        | ``IOCTL``   | ``IOCTL`` handled | ``IOCTL`` handled |

I was a bit confused at first read, wondering why IOCTL was quoted, then
I realized that it was in fact LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL. Maybe using the
"FS_" prefix would avoid this kind of misreading (same for READ_FILE)?

> +|                        | not handled | and permitted     | and not permitted |
> ++------------------------+-------------+-------------------+-------------------+
> +| ``READ_FILE`` not      | allow       | allow             | deny              |
> +| handled                |             |                   |                   |
> ++------------------------+             +-------------------+-------------------+
> +| ``READ_FILE`` handled  |             | allow                                 |
> +| and permitted          |             |                                       |
> ++------------------------+             +-------------------+-------------------+
> +| ``READ_FILE`` handled  |             | deny                                  |
> +| and not permitted      |             |                                       |

If it makes the raw text easier to read, it should be OK to extend this
table to 100 columns (I guess checkpatch.pl will not complain).

> ++------------------------+-------------+-------------------+-------------------+
> +
> +The full list of IOCTL commands and the access rights which affect them is
> +documented below.
>  
>  Compatibility
>  =============
> @@ -457,6 +514,28 @@ Memory usage
>  Kernel memory allocated to create rulesets is accounted and can be restricted
>  by the Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v1/memory.rst.
>  
> +IOCTL support
> +-------------
> +
> +The ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL`` access right restricts the use of
> +:manpage:`ioctl(2)`, but it only applies to newly opened files.  This means
> +specifically that pre-existing file descriptors like stdin, stdout and stderr
> +are unaffected.
> +
> +Users should be aware that TTY devices have traditionally permitted to control
> +other processes on the same TTY through the ``TIOCSTI`` and ``TIOCLINUX`` IOCTL
> +commands.  It is therefore recommended to close inherited TTY file descriptors,
> +or to reopen them from ``/proc/self/fd/*`` without the
> +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL`` right, if possible.  The :manpage:`isatty(3)`
> +function checks whether a given file descriptor is a TTY.
> +
> +Landlock's IOCTL support is coarse-grained at the moment, but may become more
> +fine-grained in the future.  Until then, users are advised to establish the
> +guarantees that they need through the file hierarchy, by only permitting the
> +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL`` right on files where it is really harmless.  In
> +cases where you can control the mounts, the ``nodev`` mount option can help to
> +rule out that device files can be accessed.
> +



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