[PATCH v7 9/9] landlock: Document IOCTL support

Jeff Xu jeffxu at chromium.org
Fri Dec 1 19:55:03 UTC 2023


On Fri, Dec 1, 2023 at 6:41 AM Günther Noack <gnoack at google.com> wrote:
>
> In the paragraph above the fallback logic, use the shorter phrasing
> from the landlock(7) man page.
>
> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack at google.com>
> ---
>  Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 74 +++++++++++++++++++-----
>  1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> index 2e3822677061..68498ca64dc9 100644
> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> @@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
>              LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK |
>              LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM |
>              LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
> -            LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
> +            LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE |
> +            LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL,
>          .handled_access_net =
>              LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>              LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> @@ -84,10 +85,10 @@ to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
>  Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be
>  executed, it is safer to follow a best-effort security approach.  Indeed, we
>  should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they are
> -using.  To avoid binary enforcement (i.e. either all security features or
> -none), we can leverage a dedicated Landlock command to get the current version
> -of the Landlock ABI and adapt the handled accesses.  Let's check if we should
> -remove access rights which are only supported in higher versions of the ABI.
> +using.
> +
> +To be compatible with older Linux versions, we detect the available Landlock ABI
> +version, and only use the available subset of access rights:
>
>  .. code-block:: c
>
> @@ -113,6 +114,10 @@ remove access rights which are only supported in higher versions of the ABI.
>          ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
>              ~(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>                LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
> +        __attribute__((fallthrough));
> +    case 4:
> +        /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL for ABI < 5 */
> +        ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL;
>      }
>
>  This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
> @@ -224,6 +229,7 @@ access rights per directory enables to change the location of such directory
>  without relying on the destination directory access rights (except those that
>  are required for this operation, see ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER``
>  documentation).
> +
>  Having self-sufficient hierarchies also helps to tighten the required access
>  rights to the minimal set of data.  This also helps avoid sinkhole directories,
>  i.e.  directories where data can be linked to but not linked from.  However,
> @@ -317,18 +323,24 @@ It should also be noted that truncating files does not require the
>  system call, this can also be done through :manpage:`open(2)` with the flags
>  ``O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC``.
>
> -When opening a file, the availability of the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE``
> -right is associated with the newly created file descriptor and will be used for
> -subsequent truncation attempts using :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`.  The behavior is
> -similar to opening a file for reading or writing, where permissions are checked
> -during :manpage:`open(2)`, but not during the subsequent :manpage:`read(2)` and
> +The truncate right is associated with the opened file (see below).
> +
> +Rights associated with file descriptors
> +---------------------------------------
> +
> +When opening a file, the availability of the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` and
> +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL`` rights is associated with the newly created file
> +descriptor and will be used for subsequent truncation and ioctl attempts using
> +:manpage:`ftruncate(2)` and :manpage:`ioctl(2)`.  The behavior is similar to
> +opening a file for reading or writing, where permissions are checked during
> +:manpage:`open(2)`, but not during the subsequent :manpage:`read(2)` and
>  :manpage:`write(2)` calls.
>
> -As a consequence, it is possible to have multiple open file descriptors for the
> -same file, where one grants the right to truncate the file and the other does
> -not.  It is also possible to pass such file descriptors between processes,
> -keeping their Landlock properties, even when these processes do not have an
> -enforced Landlock ruleset.
> +As a consequence, it is possible to have multiple open file descriptors
> +referring to the same file, where one grants the truncate or ioctl right and the
> +other does not.  It is also possible to pass such file descriptors between
> +processes, keeping their Landlock properties, even when these processes do not
> +have an enforced Landlock ruleset.
>
I understand the "passing fd between process ", but not the " multiple
open fds referring to the same file, with different permission", are
those fds all opened within the same domain ?

Can we have a pseudocode to help understanding ?

-Jeff



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