[PATCH v10 2/4] security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook

[Casey Schaufler]

On 4/11/2023 10:25 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> On Tue, 2023-04-11 at 09:42 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 4/11/2023 12:53 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>>> On Tue, 2023-04-11 at 03:22 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>> Hi Roberto,
>>>>
>>>> Sorry for the delay in responding...
>>> Hi Mimi
>>>
>>> no worries!
>>>
>>>> The patch description reads as though support for per LSM multiple
>>>> xattrs is being added in this patch, though lsm_get_xattr_slot() only
>>>> ever is incremented once for each LSM.  To simplify review, it would be
>>>> nice to mention that lsm_get_xattr_slot() would be called multiple
>>>> times per LSM xattr.
>>> Ok, I will mention it.
>>>
>>>> On Fri, 2023-03-31 at 14:32 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>>>>> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
>>>>>
>>>>> Currently, security_inode_init_security() supports only one LSM providing
>>>>> an xattr and EVM calculating the HMAC on that xattr, plus other inode
>>>>> metadata.
>>>>>
>>>>> Allow all LSMs to provide one or multiple xattrs, by extending the security
>>>>> blob reservation mechanism. Introduce the new lbs_xattr_count field of the
>>>>> lsm_blob_sizes structure, so that each LSM can specify how many xattrs it
>>>>> needs, and the LSM infrastructure knows how many xattr slots it should
>>>>> allocate.
>>>>>
>>>>> Dynamically allocate the new_xattrs array to be populated by LSMs with the
>>>>> inode_init_security hook, and pass it to the latter instead of the
>>>>> name/value/len triple. Unify the !initxattrs and initxattrs case, simply
>>>>> don't allocate the new_xattrs array in the former.
>>>>>
>>>>> Also, pass to the hook the number of xattrs filled by each LSM, so that
>>>>> there are no gaps when the next LSM fills the array. Gaps might occur
>>>>> because an LSM can legitimately request xattrs to the LSM infrastructure,
>>>>> but not fill the reserved slots, if it was not initialized.
>>>> The number of security xattrs permitted per LSM was discussed in the
>>>> second paragraph.  The first line of this paragraph needs to be updated
>>>> to reflect the current number of security xattrs used, though that is
>>>> more related to the new lsm_get_xattr_slot().  Or perhaps the entire
>>>> paragraph is unnecessary, a remnant from
>>>> security_check_compact_filled_xattrs(), and should be removed.  
>>> I would probably say in that paragraph that the number specified for
>>> the lbs_xattr_count field determines how many times an LSM can call
>>> lsm_get_xattr_slot().
>>>
>>>>> Update the documentation of security_inode_init_security() to reflect the
>>>>> changes, and fix the description of the xattr name, as it is not allocated
>>>>> anymore.
>>>>>
>>>>> Finally, adapt both SELinux and Smack to use the new definition of the
>>>>> inode_init_security hook, and to fill the reserved slots in the xattr
>>>>> array. Introduce the lsm_get_xattr_slot() helper to retrieve an available
>>>>> slot to fill, and to increment the number of filled slots.
>>>>>
>>>>> Move the xattr->name assignment after the xattr->value one, so that it is
>>>>> done only in case of successful memory allocation. For Smack, also reserve
>>>>> space for the other defined xattrs although they are not set yet in
>>>>> smack_inode_init_security().
>>>> This Smack comment should be moved to the previous paragraph and even
>>>> expanded explaining that lsm_get_xattr_slot() will be called for each
>>>> additional security xattr.
>>>> From previous Paul's and Casey's comments, Smack will have just two
>>> xattrs, assuming that security.SMACK_TRASMUTE64 can be set in
>>> smack_inode_init_security(). I will change this part accordingly once
>>> Casey can have a look at the function.
>> To be clear, Smack may use two xattrs from smack_inode_init_security(),
>> SMACK64 and SMACK64_TRANSMUTE. SMACK64_TRANSMUTE is only set on directories.
>> SMACK64_MMAP and SMACK64_EXEC can be set on files, but they have to be
>> set explicitly. A file may have three xattrs, but only one from
>> smack_inode_init_security().
>>
>> I'm looking at the existing Smack function, and it includes checking for
>> the transmute attribute. Your patch seems to have dropped this important
>> behavior. That needs to be restored in any case. You can tell that you need
>> to include the SMACK64_TRANSMUTE xattr if setting it is detected.
> Uhm, I think it is simply omitted in the patch, not deleted.

Oops. Right you are.

>
> I just sent a draft of the modifications required to set
> SMACK64_TRANSMUTE in smack_inode_init_security().

Yup. I'll comment on that.

>
> Roberto
>
>>>>> Reported-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet at clip-os.org> (EVM crash)
>>>>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>>>>> index c2be66c669a..9eb9b686493 100644
>>>>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>>>>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>>>>> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
>>>>>  #include <linux/security.h>
>>>>>  #include <linux/init.h>
>>>>>  #include <linux/rculist.h>
>>>>> +#include <linux/xattr.h>
>>>>>  
>>>>>  union security_list_options {
>>>>>  	#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) RET (*NAME)(__VA_ARGS__);
>>>>> @@ -63,8 +64,27 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
>>>>>  	int	lbs_ipc;
>>>>>  	int	lbs_msg_msg;
>>>>>  	int	lbs_task;
>>>>> +	int	lbs_xattr_count; /* number of xattr slots in new_xattrs array */
>>>>>  };
>>>>>  
>>>>> +/**
>>>>> + * lsm_get_xattr_slot - Return the next available slot and increment the index
>>>>> + * @xattrs: array storing LSM-provided xattrs
>>>>> + * @xattr_count: number of already stored xattrs (updated)
>>>>> + *
>>>>> + * Retrieve the first available slot in the @xattrs array to fill with an xattr,
>>>>> + * and increment @xattr_count.
>>>>> + *
>>>>> + * Return: The slot to fill in @xattrs if non-NULL, NULL otherwise.
>>>>> + */
>>>>> +static inline struct xattr *lsm_get_xattr_slot(struct xattr *xattrs,
>>>>> +					       int *xattr_count)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +	if (unlikely(!xattrs))
>>>>> +		return NULL;
>>>>> +	return xattrs + (*xattr_count)++;
>>>> At some point, since lsm_get_xattr_slot() could be called multiple
>>>> times from the same LSM, shouldn't there be some sort of bounds
>>>> checking?
>>>> From previous Paul's comments, I understood that he prefers to avoid
>>> extra checks. It will be up to LSM developers to ensure that the API is
>>> used correctly.
>>>
>>> Thanks
>>>
>>> Roberto
>>>