dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement
Kees Cook
keescook at chromium.org
Thu Sep 8 16:13:31 UTC 2022
On Thu, Sep 08, 2022 at 11:25:36AM -0400, Mike Snitzer wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 07 2022 at 6:34P -0400,
> Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org> wrote:
>
> > On Wed, 7 Sep 2022 13:30:58 -0700, Matthias Kaehlcke wrote:
> > > Verity targets can be configured to ignore corrupted data blocks.
> > > LoadPin must only trust verity targets that are configured to
> > > perform some kind of enforcement when data corruption is detected,
> > > like returning an error, restarting the system or triggering a
> > > panic.
> > >
> > >
> > > [...]
> >
> > Applied to for-next/hardening, thanks!
> >
> > [1/1] dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement
> > https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/2e1875c05267
>
> Does this mean you're intending to send this upstream? I prefer to
> take all DM changes unless there is an external dependency.
Oh! Yeah, I added it to my tree since you'd asked me to take the
original verity-loadpin series and this was a fix. I'm happy either
way. Shall I drop this change from my tree?
--
Kees Cook
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