LSM stacking in next for 6.1?

[Kees Cook]

On Fri, Oct 28, 2022 at 10:58:30PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> Do you remember that 10 modules were proposed 
> 
>     SimpleFlow ( 2016/04/21 https://lwn.net/Articles/684825/ )
>     HardChroot ( 2016/07/29 https://lwn.net/Articles/695984/ )
>     Checmate ( 2016/08/04 https://lwn.net/Articles/696344/ )
>     LandLock ( 2016/08/25 https://lwn.net/Articles/698226/ )
>     PTAGS ( 2016/09/29 https://lwn.net/Articles/702639/ )
>     CaitSith ( 2016/10/21 https://lwn.net/Articles/704262/ )
>     SafeName ( 2016/05/03 https://lwn.net/Articles/686021/ )
>     WhiteEgret ( 2017/05/30 https://lwn.net/Articles/724192/ )
>     shebang ( 2017/06/09 https://lwn.net/Articles/725285/ )
>     S.A.R.A. ( 2017/06/13 https://lwn.net/Articles/725230/ )

There was also:

      LoadPin ( 2016/04/20 https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1461192388-13900-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org/ )
      SafeSetID ( 2018/10/31 https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20181031152846.234791-1-mortonm@chromium.org/ )
      BPF ( 2019/09/10 https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20190910115527.5235-1-kpsingh@chromium.org/ )

So, 13 LSM proposed, 4 landed: roughly 30%, which is on par[1] with regular
kernel development.

> I consider /sbin/insmod-able LSM modules as a compromise/remedy for LSM modules
> which could not get merged upstream or supported by distributors, for patching and
> rebuilding the whole kernel in order to use not-yet-upstreamed and/or not-builtin
> LSMs is already a lot of barrier for users. But requiring a permanent integer in
> order to use a LSM module is a denial of even patching and rebuilding the whole
> kernel. That's why I hate this change.

But the upstream kernel _does not support APIs for out-of-tree code_. To
that point, security_add_hooks() is _not exported_, so it is already not
possible to create a modular LSM without patching the kernel source.

> I can't understand why assigning a permanent integer identifier is mandatory.

Plenty of other APIs use numeric identifiers: syscalls, prctl, etc. This
doesn't block them from being upstreamed.

-Kees

[1] https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/6624016

-- 
Kees Cook