[PATCH 2/9] security: Move trivial IMA hooks into LSM
Kees Cook
keescook at chromium.org
Thu Oct 13 22:36:47 UTC 2022
This moves the trivial hard-coded stacking of IMA LSM hooks into the
existing LSM infrastructure.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris at namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge at hallyn.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin at gmail.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic at digikod.net>
Cc: Petr Vorel <pvorel at suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp at suse.de>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai at suse.de>
Cc: Jonathan McDowell <noodles at fb.com>
Cc: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity at vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
---
include/linux/ima.h | 50 -----------------------------
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++-------
security/security.c | 52 ++++++-------------------------
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 105 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 81708ca0ebc7..3c641cc65270 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -16,20 +16,10 @@ struct linux_binprm;
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
extern enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void);
-extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct inode *inode);
extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
-extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
-extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot);
-extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
-extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
- enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description);
-extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
- bool contents);
-extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
- enum kernel_read_file_id id);
extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry);
extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
@@ -56,11 +46,6 @@ static inline enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
return HASH_ALGO__LAST;
}
-static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
return 0;
@@ -76,41 +61,6 @@ static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
return;
}
-static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned long prot)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
- enum kernel_load_data_id id,
- char *description)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
- bool contents)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
- enum kernel_read_file_id id)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry)
{
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index e617863af5ff..2cff001b02e4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
/**
* ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
* @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
+ * @reqprot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
* @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
*
* Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
@@ -403,11 +404,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
+static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
{
u32 secid;
- if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
+ if (file && (reqprot & PROT_EXEC)) {
security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
@@ -419,6 +421,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
/**
* ima_file_mprotect - based on policy, limit mprotect change
* @vma: vm_area_struct protection is set to
+ * @reqprot: contains the protection that were requested.
* @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
*
* Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent
@@ -429,7 +432,8 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
*
* On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS.
*/
-int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
+static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
{
struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
struct file *file;
@@ -483,7 +487,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
u32 secid;
@@ -706,8 +710,8 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
*
* For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
- bool contents)
+static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+ bool contents)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
u32 secid;
@@ -756,8 +760,8 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
- enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
enum ima_hooks func;
u32 secid;
@@ -790,7 +794,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
*
* For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
{
bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
@@ -844,9 +848,9 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
* On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
* is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
- enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
- char *description)
+static int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
+ char *description)
{
if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -1077,6 +1081,18 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
+static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ima_bprm_check),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ima_file_mmap),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ima_file_mprotect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ima_read_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_read_file, ima_post_read_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ima_load_data),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_load_data, ima_post_load_data),
+};
+
void __init integrity_lsm_ima_init(void)
{
+ pr_info("Integrity LSM enabling IMA\n");
+ integrity_add_lsm_hooks(ima_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(ima_hooks));
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 14d30fec8a00..8f7c1b5fa5fa 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -862,12 +862,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
+ return call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
}
void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -1589,12 +1584,8 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags)
{
- int ret;
- ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot,
- mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
+ return call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot,
+ mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
}
int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
@@ -1605,12 +1596,7 @@ int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot);
+ return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
}
int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
@@ -1746,35 +1732,20 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
bool contents)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ima_read_file(file, id, contents);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ima_load_data(id, contents);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
@@ -1782,13 +1753,8 @@ int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_load_data_id id,
char *description)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
- description);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
+ description);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
--
2.34.1
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