[PATCH v8 4/9] landlock: Support file truncation

Mickaël Salaün mic at digikod.net
Wed Oct 5 18:55:42 UTC 2022


On 01/10/2022 17:49, Günther Noack wrote:
> Introduce the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE flag for file truncation.
> 
> This flag hooks into the path_truncate LSM hook and covers file
> truncation using truncate(2), ftruncate(2), open(2) with O_TRUNC, as
> well as creat().
> 
> This change also increments the Landlock ABI version, updates
> corresponding selftests, and updates code documentation to document
> the flag.
> 
> The following operations are restricted:
> 
> open(): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right if a file gets
> implicitly truncated as part of the open() (e.g. using O_TRUNC).
> 
> Notable special cases:
> * open(..., O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC) can truncate files as well in Linux
> * open() with O_TRUNC does *not* need the TRUNCATE right when it
>    creates a new file.
> 
> truncate() (on a path): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
> right.
> 
> ftruncate() (on a file): requires that the file had the TRUNCATE right
> when it was previously opened.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000 at gmail.com>
> ---
>   include/uapi/linux/landlock.h                |  21 +++-
>   security/landlock/fs.c                       | 102 +++++++++++++++++--
>   security/landlock/fs.h                       |  24 +++++
>   security/landlock/limits.h                   |   2 +-
>   security/landlock/setup.c                    |   1 +
>   security/landlock/syscalls.c                 |   2 +-
>   tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c |   2 +-
>   tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c   |   7 +-
>   8 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> index 23df4e0e8ace..d830cdfdbe56 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> @@ -95,8 +95,19 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
>    * A file can only receive these access rights:
>    *
>    * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE: Execute a file.
> - * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access.
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. Note that
> + *   you might additionally need the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` right in

%LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE


> + *   order to overwrite files with :manpage:`open(2)` using `O_TRUNC` or
> + *   :manpage:`creat(2)`.
>    * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE: Open a file with read access.
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE: Truncate a file with :manpage:`truncate(2)`,
> + *   :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`, :manpage:`creat(2)`, or :manpage:`open(2)` with
> + *   `O_TRUNC`. Whether an opened file can be truncated with

%O_TRUNC


> + *   :manpage:`ftruncate(2)` is determined during :manpage:`open(2)`, in the
> + *   same way as read and write permissions are checked during
> + *   :manpage:`open(2)` using %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE and
> + *   %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE. This access right is available since the
> + *   third version of the Landlock ABI.
>    *
>    * A directory can receive access rights related to files or directories.  The
>    * following access right is applied to the directory itself, and the
> @@ -139,10 +150,9 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
>    *
>    *   It is currently not possible to restrict some file-related actions
>    *   accessible through these syscall families: :manpage:`chdir(2)`,
> - *   :manpage:`truncate(2)`, :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`,
> - *   :manpage:`chmod(2)`, :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`,
> - *   :manpage:`utime(2)`, :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`,
> - *   :manpage:`access(2)`.
> + *   :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, :manpage:`chmod(2)`,
> + *   :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, :manpage:`utime(2)`,
> + *   :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, :manpage:`access(2)`.
>    *   Future Landlock evolutions will enable to restrict them.
>    */
>   /* clang-format off */
> @@ -160,6 +170,7 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
>   #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK			(1ULL << 11)
>   #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM			(1ULL << 12)
>   #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER			(1ULL << 13)
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE			(1ULL << 14)
>   /* clang-format on */
>   
>   #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
> index 083dd3d359de..80d507ce2305 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/fs.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
> @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
>   #define ACCESS_FILE ( \
>   	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
>   	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
> -	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)
> +	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
> +	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
>   /* clang-format on */
>   
>   /*
> @@ -297,6 +298,18 @@ get_handled_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
>   	return access_dom & LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
>   }
>   
> +/*
> + * init_layer_masks - Populates @layer_masks such that for each access right in
> + * @access_request, the bits for all the layers are set where this access right
> + * is handled.

Thanks for this extra documentation!

Can you convert it to a proper code documentation (even if it not used 
yet), with a heading `/**` and a short title following the function 
name? Something like "init_layer_masks - Initialize layer masks". Please 
follow this convention for the other doc strings, or just use a 
paragraph in a simple comment (e.g. for get_required_file_open_access).

Because there is no direct link with Landlock supporting truncation, 
this should be in a standalone patch, but you can keep it in this series.


> + *
> + * @domain: The domain that defines the current restrictions.
> + * @access_request: The requested access rights to check.
> + * @layer_masks: The layer masks to populate.
> + *
> + * Returns: An access mask where each access right bit is set which is handled
> + * in any of the active layers in @domain.
> + */
>   static inline access_mask_t
>   init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
>   		 const access_mask_t access_request,
> @@ -1141,9 +1154,19 @@ static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir,
>   	return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR);
>   }
>   
> +static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const path)
> +{
> +	return current_check_access_path(path, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
> +}
> +
>   /* File hooks */
>   
> -static inline access_mask_t get_file_access(const struct file *const file)
> +/*
> + * get_required_file_open_access - Returns the access rights that are required
> + * for opening the file, depending on the file type and open mode.
> + */
> +static inline access_mask_t
> +get_required_file_open_access(const struct file *const file)
>   {
>   	access_mask_t access = 0;
>   
> @@ -1163,17 +1186,82 @@ static inline access_mask_t get_file_access(const struct file *const file)
>   
>   static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
>   {
> +	layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
> +	access_mask_t open_access_request, full_access_request, allowed_access;
> +	const access_mask_t optional_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
>   	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
>   		landlock_get_current_domain();
>   
> -	if (!dom)
> +	if (!dom) {
> +		/*
> +		 * Grants all access rights, even if most of them are not
> +		 * checked later on. It is more consistent.
> +		 */
> +		landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;

This looks like the right approach but unfortunately, because there is 
multiple ways to get a file descriptors (e.g. memfd_create, which is 
worth mentioning in a comment), this doesn't work well. For now, it only 
makes sense for Landlock to restrict file descriptors obtained through 
open(2). We can then move this initialization to a new hook 
implementation for file_alloc_security.

I think this is the bug Nathan reported.

We should have a test with memfd_create(2) to make sure it works as 
expected. I think the documentation is still correct though.



>   		return 0;
> +	}
> +
>   	/*
> -	 * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_file_access() may
> -	 * return 0.  This case will be handled with a future Landlock
> +	 * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_required_file_open_access()
> +	 * may return 0.  This case will be handled with a future Landlock
>   	 * evolution.
>   	 */
> -	return check_access_path(dom, &file->f_path, get_file_access(file));
> +	open_access_request = get_required_file_open_access(file);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * We look up more access than what we immediately need for open(), so
> +	 * that we can later authorize operations on opened files.
> +	 */
> +	full_access_request = open_access_request | optional_access;
> +
> +	allowed_access = full_access_request;
> +	if (!is_access_to_paths_allowed(
> +		    dom, &file->f_path,
> +		    init_layer_masks(dom, full_access_request, &layer_masks),
> +		    &layer_masks, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {

I'd prefer (less error prone and easier to read) to add an 
is_access_paths_allowed branch to initialize allowed_access with 
full_access_request, and tweak this branch to initialize allowed_access 
with 0 and then populate it according to !layer_masks[access_bit].


> +		unsigned long access_bit;
> +		unsigned long access_req = full_access_request;

const unsigned long access_req


> +
> +		/*
> +		 * Calculate the actual allowed access rights from layer_masks.
> +		 * Remove each access right from allowed_access which has been
> +		 * vetoed by any layer.
> +		 */
> +		for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req,
> +				 ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)) {
> +			if (layer_masks[access_bit])
> +				allowed_access &= ~BIT_ULL(access_bit); > +		}
> +	}

We can move `landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = allowed_access` here 
to be sure that the struct file allowed access is consistent even if it 
should not be used (because access may be denied).


> +
> +	if (open_access_request & ~allowed_access)
> +		return -EACCES;

And here invert the check ((open_access_request & allowed_access) == 
open_access_request) to make it more consistent with other checks…


> +
> +	/*
> +	 * For operations on already opened files (i.e. ftruncate()), it is the
> +	 * access rights at the time of open() which decide whether the
> +	 * operation is permitted. Therefore, we record the relevant subset of
> +	 * file access rights in the opened struct file.
> +	 */
> +	landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = allowed_access;
> +	return 0;

…and return -EACCES here.


> +}
> +
> +static int hook_file_truncate(struct file *const file)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * Allows truncation if the truncate right was available at the time of
> +	 * opening the file, to get a consistent access check as for read, write
> +	 * and execute operations.
> +	 *
> +	 * Note: For checks done based on the file's Landlock rights, we enforce

s/file's Landlock rights/file's Landlock allowed access/ maybe?


> +	 * them independently of whether the current thread is in a Landlock
> +	 * domain, so that open files passed between independent processes
> +	 * retain their behaviour.
> +	 */
> +	if (landlock_file(file)->allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
> +		return 0;
> +	return -EACCES;
>   }
>   
>   static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> @@ -1193,6 +1281,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>   	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink),
>   	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink),
>   	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, hook_path_truncate),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, hook_file_truncate),

Please move the hook_file_truncate entry after the hook_file_open one, 
these entries are in the same order as their hook implementations.


>   
>   	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open),
>   };
> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.h b/security/landlock/fs.h
> index 8db7acf9109b..488e4813680a 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/fs.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.h
> @@ -36,6 +36,24 @@ struct landlock_inode_security {
>   	struct landlock_object __rcu *object;
>   };
>   
> +/**
> + * struct landlock_file_security - File security blob
> + *
> + * This information is populated when opening a file in hook_file_open, and
> + * tracks the relevant Landlock access rights that were available at the time
> + * of opening the file. Other LSM hooks use these rights in order to authorize
> + * operations on already opened files.
> + */
> +struct landlock_file_security {
> +	/**
> +	 * @allowed_access: Access rights that were available at the time of
> +	 * opening the file. This is not necessarily the full set of access
> +	 * rights available at that time, but it's the necessary subset as
> +	 * needed to authorize later operations on the open file.
> +	 */
> +	access_mask_t allowed_access;
> +};
> +
>   /**
>    * struct landlock_superblock_security - Superblock security blob
>    *
> @@ -50,6 +68,12 @@ struct landlock_superblock_security {
>   	atomic_long_t inode_refs;
>   };
>   
> +static inline struct landlock_file_security *
> +landlock_file(const struct file *const file)
> +{
> +	return file->f_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
> +}
> +
>   static inline struct landlock_inode_security *
>   landlock_inode(const struct inode *const inode)
>   {
> diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
> index b54184ab9439..82288f0e9e5e 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/limits.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
> @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
>   #define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS		16
>   #define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES		U32_MAX
>   
> -#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS		LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
> +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS		LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
>   #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS		((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)
>   #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS		__const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
>   
> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
> index f8e8e980454c..3f196d2ce4f9 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/setup.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false;
>   
>   struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>   	.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct landlock_cred_security),
> +	.lbs_file = sizeof(struct landlock_file_security),
>   	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct landlock_inode_security),
>   	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
>   };
> diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> index 735a0865ea11..f4d6fc7ed17f 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
>   	.write = fop_dummy_write,
>   };
>   
> -#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 2
> +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 3
>   
>   /**
>    * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
> index da9290817866..72cdae277b02 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
> @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ TEST(abi_version)
>   	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
>   		.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
>   	};
> -	ASSERT_EQ(2, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
> +	ASSERT_EQ(3, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
>   					     LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
>   
>   	ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> index 45de42a027c5..87b28d14a1aa 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> @@ -406,9 +406,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)
>   #define ACCESS_FILE ( \
>   	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
>   	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
> -	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)
> +	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
> +	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
>   
> -#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
> +#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
>   
>   #define ACCESS_ALL ( \
>   	ACCESS_FILE | \
> @@ -422,7 +423,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)
>   	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \
>   	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \
>   	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \
> -	ACCESS_LAST)
> +	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)
>   
>   /* clang-format on */
>   



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