[PATCH v4] evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors

[Roberto Sassu]

On Fri, 2022-11-18 at 15:20 +0100, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 04, 2022 at 02:43:25PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > On Thu, 2022-11-03 at 16:27 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > On Wed, 2022-10-26 at 16:30 +0200, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
> > > > From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet at ssi.gouv.fr>
> > > > 
> > > > Fixes a NULL pointer dereference occurring in the
> > > > `evm_protected_xattr_common` function of the EVM LSM. The bug is
> > > > triggered if a `inode_init_security` hook returns 0 without initializing
> > > > the given `struct xattr` fields (which is the case of BPF) and if no
> > > > other LSM overrides thoses fields after. This also leads to memory
> > > > leaks.
> > > > 
> > > > The `call_int_hook_xattr` macro has been inlined into the
> > > > `security_inode_init_security` hook in order to check hooks return
> > > > values and skip ones who doesn't init `xattrs`.
> > > > 
> > > > Modify `evm_init_hmac` function to init the EVM hmac using every
> > > > entry of the given xattr array.
> > > > 
> > > > The `MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR` value is now based on the security modules
> > > > compiled in, which gives room for SMACK, SELinux, Apparmor, BPF and
> > > > IMA/EVM security attributes.
> > > > 
> > > > Changes the default return value of the `inode_init_security` hook
> > > > definition to `-EOPNOTSUPP`.
> > > > 
> > > > Changes the hook documentation to match the behavior of the LSMs using
> > > > it (only xattr->value is initialised with kmalloc and thus is the only
> > > > one that should be kfreed by the caller).
> > > > 
> > > > Cc: roberto.sassu at huaweicloud.com
> > > > Signed-off-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet at ssi.gouv.fr>
> > > > ---
> > > > Changes since v3:
> > > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1fu4jofqLHVDprT@archlinux/
> > > > 
> > > > * Fixes compilation error reported by the kernel test robot.
> > > > ---
> > > >  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h       |  2 +-
> > > >  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h           |  4 ++--
> > > >  security/integrity/evm/evm.h        |  1 +
> > > >  security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c |  9 +++++++--
> > > >  security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c   |  7 ++++---
> > > >  security/security.c                 | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> > > >  6 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> > > > 
> > > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> > > > index 806448173033..e5dd0c0f6345 100644
> > > > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> > > > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> > > > @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_notify, const struct path *path, u64 mask,
> > > >  	 unsigned int obj_type)
> > > >  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_alloc_security, struct inode *inode)
> > > >  LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_free_security, struct inode *inode)
> > > > -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode,
> > > > +LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode,
> > > >  	 struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
> > > >  	 void **value, size_t *len)
> > > >  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode,
> > > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > > > index 84a0d7e02176..95aff9383de1 100644
> > > > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > > > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > > > @@ -229,8 +229,8 @@
> > > >   *	This hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation
> > > >   *	transaction and provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike
> > > >   *	the post_create/mkdir/... hooks called by the VFS.  The hook function
> > > > - *	is expected to allocate the name and value via kmalloc, with the caller
> > > > - *	being responsible for calling kfree after using them.
> > > > + *	is expected to allocate the value via kmalloc, with the caller
> > > > + *	being responsible for calling kfree after using it.
> > > 
> > > Please also update the description of @name as well (remove allocated).
> > 
> > While you update the patch, I worked on the other patches: reiserfs
> > fixes, if we want still to apply them; expand the call_int_hook() loop
> > also for security_old_inode_init_security() to have consistent behavior
> > across all filesystems.
> 
> Thank's I didn't had time to read the patch, will do it.

Hi Nicolas

in the meantime we went further. As Paul commented that he would prefer
to use the reservation mechanism for xattrs, instead of a static
allocation, I resumed my old patch set, which would include also your
changes.

Will send a new version shortly. Will appreciate your feedback!

Thanks

Roberto

> > The patches are available here:
> > 
> > https://github.com/robertosassu/linux/tree/evm-multiple-lsms-nicolas-v1-devel-v6
> > 
> > Other than Github Actions related patches, there is also TestLSM, which
> > I developed to ensure that xattrs are correctly created.
> > 
> > I also adapted the IMA/EVM tests, which are available here:
> > 
> > https://github.com/robertosassu/ima-evm-utils/tree/evm-multiple-lsms-nicolas-v1-devel-v6
> > 
> > Nicolas, if you want to test the new patch locally, build the UML
> > kernel with:
> Will surely do ! Thanks.
> > make ARCH=um -j$(nproc)
> > 
> > Build ima-evm-utils, and copy linux and certs/signing_key.pem from the
> > kernel source directory to the ima-evm-utils directory. Then, run:
> > 
> > tests/evm_multiple_lsms.test
> > 
> > It basically runs the UML kernel with different combinations of LSMs
> > (some providing an xattr, some not) and compares the HMAC calculated by
> > EVM in the kernel with the HMAC calculated by evmctl in user space.
> > 
> > Roberto
> > 
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Nicolas Bouchinet