[PATCH bpf] selftests/bpf: fix memory leak of lsm_cgroup

wangyufen wangyufen at huawei.com
Tue Nov 15 03:07:03 UTC 2022


在 2022/11/15 1:34, sdf at google.com 写道:
> On 11/14, Wang Yufen wrote:
>> kmemleak reports this issue:
>
>> unreferenced object 0xffff88810b7835c0 (size 32):
>>    comm "test_progs", pid 270, jiffies 4294969007 (age 1621.315s)
>>    hex dump (first 32 bytes):
>>      00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>      03 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 0f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
>>    backtrace:
>>      [<00000000376cdeab>] kmalloc_trace+0x27/0x110
>>      [<000000003bcdb3b6>] selinux_sk_alloc_security+0x66/0x110
>>      [<000000003959008f>] security_sk_alloc+0x47/0x80
>>      [<00000000e7bc6668>] sk_prot_alloc+0xbd/0x1a0
>>      [<0000000002d6343a>] sk_alloc+0x3b/0x940
>>      [<000000009812a46d>] unix_create1+0x8f/0x3d0
>>      [<000000005ed0976b>] unix_create+0xa1/0x150
>>      [<0000000086a1d27f>] __sock_create+0x233/0x4a0
>>      [<00000000cffe3a73>] __sys_socket_create.part.0+0xaa/0x110
>>      [<0000000007c63f20>] __sys_socket+0x49/0xf0
>>      [<00000000b08753c8>] __x64_sys_socket+0x42/0x50
>>      [<00000000b56e26b3>] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
>>      [<000000009b4871b8>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
>
>> The issue occurs in the following scenarios:
>
>> unix_create1()
>>    sk_alloc()
>>      sk_prot_alloc()
>>        security_sk_alloc()
>>          call_int_hook()
>>            hlist_for_each_entry()
>>              entry1->hook.sk_alloc_security
>>              <-- selinux_sk_alloc_security() succeeded,
>>              <-- sk->security alloced here.
>>              entry2->hook.sk_alloc_security
>>              <-- bpf_lsm_sk_alloc_security() failed
>>        goto out_free;
>>          ...    <-- the sk->security not freed, memleak
>
>> The core problem is that the LSM is not yet fully stacked (work is
>> actively going on in this space) which means that some LSM hooks do
>> not support multiple LSMs at the same time. To fix, skip the
>> "EPERM" test when it runs in the environments that already have
>> non-bpf lsms installed
>
>> Fixes: dca85aac8895 ("selftests/bpf: lsm_cgroup functional test")
>> Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen at huawei.com>
>> Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf at google.com>
>> ---
>>   tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_cgroup.c | 19 
>> +++++++++++++++----
>>   tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c      |  8 ++++++++
>>   2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_cgroup.c 
>> b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_cgroup.c
>> index 1102e4f..a927ade 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_cgroup.c
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_cgroup.c
>> @@ -173,10 +173,14 @@ static void test_lsm_cgroup_functional(void)
>>       ASSERT_EQ(query_prog_cnt(cgroup_fd, NULL), 4, "total prog count");
>>       ASSERT_EQ(query_prog_cnt(cgroup_fd2, NULL), 1, "total prog 
>> count");
>
>> -    /* AF_UNIX is prohibited. */
>> -
>>       fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
>> -    ASSERT_LT(fd, 0, "socket(AF_UNIX)");
>> +    if (skel->kconfig->CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
>> +        || skel->kconfig->CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
>> +        || skel->kconfig->CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)
>
> [..]
>
>> +        ASSERT_GE(fd, 0, "socket(AF_UNIX)");
>
> nit: maybe skip this completely instead of having ASSERT_GE+close?
>
>     if (!(skel->kconfig->CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR || _SELINUX || _SMACK)
>         /* AF_UNIX is prohibited. */
>         ASSERT_LT(fd, 0, "socket(AF_UNIX)");


OK, thanks! Will change in v2

>
>
>> +    else
>> +        /* AF_UNIX is prohibited. */
>> +        ASSERT_LT(fd, 0, "socket(AF_UNIX)");
>>       close(fd);
>
>>       /* AF_INET6 gets default policy (sk_priority). */
>> @@ -233,11 +237,18 @@ static void test_lsm_cgroup_functional(void)
>
>>       /* AF_INET6+SOCK_STREAM
>>        * AF_PACKET+SOCK_RAW
>> +     * AF_UNIX+SOCK_RAW if already have non-bpf lsms installed
>>        * listen_fd
>>        * client_fd
>>        * accepted_fd
>>        */
>> -    ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->called_socket_post_create2, 5, 
>> "called_create2");
>> +    if (skel->kconfig->CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
>> +        || skel->kconfig->CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
>> +        || skel->kconfig->CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)
>> +        /* AF_UNIX+SOCK_RAW if already have non-bpf lsms installed */
>> +        ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->called_socket_post_create2, 6, 
>> "called_create2");
>> +    else
>> +        ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->called_socket_post_create2, 5, 
>> "called_create2");
>
>>       /* start_server
>>        * bind(ETH_P_ALL)
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c 
>> b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c
>> index 4f2d60b..02c11d1 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c
>> @@ -7,6 +7,10 @@
>
>>   char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
>
>> +extern bool CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX __kconfig __weak;
>> +extern bool CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK __kconfig __weak;
>> +extern bool CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR __kconfig __weak;
>> +
>>   #ifndef AF_PACKET
>>   #define AF_PACKET 17
>>   #endif
>> @@ -140,6 +144,10 @@ int BPF_PROG(socket_bind2, struct socket *sock, 
>> struct sockaddr *address,
>>   int BPF_PROG(socket_alloc, struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t 
>> priority)
>>   {
>>       called_socket_alloc++;
>> +    /* if already have non-bpf lsms installed, EPERM will cause 
>> memory leak of non-bpf lsms */
>> +    if (CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX || CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK || 
>> CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)
>> +        return 1;
>> +
>>       if (family == AF_UNIX)
>>           return 0; /* EPERM */
>
>> -- 
>> 1.8.3.1
>



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