[PATCH v8 16/17] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found
Morten Linderud
morten at linderud.pw
Thu Nov 10 15:06:07 UTC 2022
On Thu, Nov 10, 2022 at 12:54:43AM +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>
>
> > On Nov 9, 2022, at 5:01 PM, Morten Linderud <morten at linderud.pw> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Nov 23, 2021 at 11:41:23PM -0500, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> >> A new Machine Owner Key (MOK) variable called MokListTrustedRT has been
> >> introduced in shim. When this UEFI variable is set, it indicates the
> >> end-user has made the decision themselves that they wish to trust MOK keys
> >> within the Linux trust boundary. It is not an error if this variable
> >> does not exist. If it does not exist, the MOK keys should not be trusted
> >> within the kernel.
> >
> > Hi Eric,
> >
> > I've been milling around on this patch-set for a while and I have a few issues
> > with the description of the commit and what the code actually does.
> >
> > efi_mokvar_entry_find doesn't simply read an UEFI variable as the commit message
> > suggests, it will look for the MOK variable loaded into the EFI configuration
> > table. This implies we need this table setup in early boot to take usage of this
> > patch set.
> >
> > The only bootloader that does setup this table, is the `shim` as described. But
> > no other bootloader implements support for the MOK EFI configuration table.
> >
> > This effectively means that there is still no way for Machine Owners to load
> > keys into the keyring, for things like module signing, without the shim present
> > in the bootchain. I find this a bit weird.
> >
> > Is this an intentional design decision, or could other ways be supported as
> > well?
>
> In v6 I had it as a RT variable, during the review a request was made [1] to just
> use the EFI configuration table. If there are other boot loaders that want to use this,
> I don’t see why the code in v6 couldn’t be added back. If the configuration table isn’t
> available, it could try reading the RT var next.
>
> 1. https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-integrity/patch/20210914211416.34096-13-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/#24453409
>
If we could support both the EFI variables and the EFI configuration table setup
it would hopefully be easier for others to implement the interface? I wouldn't
mind trying to write a patch for that if others think it's a good idea.
I'm not really sure what Peter means with "much more reliable" though.
--
Morten Linderud
PGP: 9C02FF419FECBE16
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