[PATCH v12 02/26] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support
Serge E. Hallyn
serge at hallyn.com
Sat May 21 02:23:02 UTC 2022
On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 10:06:09AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> Enable multiple instances of securityfs by keying each instance with a
> pointer to the user namespace it belongs to.
>
> Since we do not need the pinning of the filesystem for the virtualization
> case, limit the usage of simple_pin_fs() and simpe_release_fs() to the
> case when the init_user_ns is active. This simplifies the cleanup for the
> virtualization case where usage of securityfs_remove() to free dentries
> is therefore not needed anymore.
>
> For the initial securityfs, i.e. the one mounted in the host userns mount,
> nothing changes. The rules for securityfs_remove() are as before and it is
> still paired with securityfs_create(). Specifically, a file created via
> securityfs_create_dentry() in the initial securityfs mount still needs to
> be removed by a call to securityfs_remove(). Creating a new dentry in the
> initial securityfs mount still pins the filesystem like it always did.
> Consequently, the initial securityfs mount is not destroyed on
> umount/shutdown as long as at least one user of it still has dentries that
> it hasn't removed with a call to securityfs_remove().
>
> Prevent mounting of an instance of securityfs in another user namespace
> than it belongs to. Also, prevent accesses to files and directories by
> a user namespace that is neither the user namespace it belongs to
> nor an ancestor of the user namespace that the instance of securityfs
> belongs to. Do not prevent access if securityfs was bind-mounted and
> therefore the init_user_ns is the owning user namespace.
>
> Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner at kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb at linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley at HansenPartnership.com>
>
> ---
> v11:
> - Formatted comment's first line to be '/*'
> ---
> security/inode.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
> index 13e6780c4444..84c9396792a9 100644
> --- a/security/inode.c
> +++ b/security/inode.c
> @@ -21,9 +21,38 @@
> #include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> #include <linux/magic.h>
> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
>
> -static struct vfsmount *mount;
> -static int mount_count;
> +static struct vfsmount *init_securityfs_mount;
> +static int init_securityfs_mount_count;
> +
> +static int securityfs_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
> + struct inode *inode, int mask)
> +{
> + int err;
> +
> + err = generic_permission(&init_user_ns, inode, mask);
> + if (!err) {
> + /*
> + * Unless bind-mounted, deny access if current_user_ns() is not
> + * ancestor.
This comment has confused me the last few times I looked at this. I see
now you're using "bind-mounted" as a shortcut for saying "bind mounted from
the init_user_ns into a child_user_ns container". I do think that needs
to be made clearer in this comment.
Should the init_user_ns really be special here? What if I'm running a
first level container with uptodate userspace that mounts its own
securityfs, but in that i want to run a nested older userspace that
bind mounts the parent securityfs? Is there a good reason to deny that?
It would seem to me the better check would be
if (!is_original_mounter_of(current_user_ns, inode->i_sb->s_user_ns) &&
!in_userns(current_user_ns(), inode->i_sb->s_user_ns))
err = -EACCESS;
the is_original_mounter_of() would require the user_ns to cache first
its parent securityfs userns, and, when a task in the user_ns mounts
securityfs, then cache its own userns. (without a reference).
If current_user_ns() has mounted a securityfs for a user_ns other than
inode->i_sb->s_user_ns (or init_user_ns), then reject the mount.
Otherwise check current_user_ns()->parent, etc, until init_user_ns.
If you reach init_user_ns, or an ns which mounted inode->i_sb->s_user_ns,
then allow, else deny.
It's the kind of special casing we've worked hard to avoid in other
namespaces.
> + */
> + if (inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
> + !in_userns(current_user_ns(), inode->i_sb->s_user_ns))
> + err = -EACCES;
> + }
> +
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +static const struct inode_operations securityfs_dir_inode_operations = {
> + .permission = securityfs_permission,
> + .lookup = simple_lookup,
> +};
> +
> +static const struct inode_operations securityfs_file_inode_operations = {
> + .permission = securityfs_permission,
> +};
>
> static void securityfs_free_inode(struct inode *inode)
> {
> @@ -40,20 +69,25 @@ static const struct super_operations securityfs_super_operations = {
> static int securityfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
> {
> static const struct tree_descr files[] = {{""}};
> + struct user_namespace *ns = fc->user_ns;
> int error;
>
> + if (WARN_ON(ns != current_user_ns()))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> error = simple_fill_super(sb, SECURITYFS_MAGIC, files);
> if (error)
> return error;
>
> sb->s_op = &securityfs_super_operations;
> + sb->s_root->d_inode->i_op = &securityfs_dir_inode_operations;
>
> return 0;
> }
>
> static int securityfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
> {
> - return get_tree_single(fc, securityfs_fill_super);
> + return get_tree_keyed(fc, securityfs_fill_super, fc->user_ns);
> }
>
> static const struct fs_context_operations securityfs_context_ops = {
> @@ -71,6 +105,7 @@ static struct file_system_type fs_type = {
> .name = "securityfs",
> .init_fs_context = securityfs_init_fs_context,
> .kill_sb = kill_litter_super,
> + .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
> };
>
> /**
> @@ -109,6 +144,7 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
> const struct file_operations *fops,
> const struct inode_operations *iops)
> {
> + struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
> struct dentry *dentry;
> struct inode *dir, *inode;
> int error;
> @@ -118,12 +154,19 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
>
> pr_debug("securityfs: creating file '%s'\n",name);
>
> - error = simple_pin_fs(&fs_type, &mount, &mount_count);
> - if (error)
> - return ERR_PTR(error);
> + if (ns == &init_user_ns) {
> + error = simple_pin_fs(&fs_type, &init_securityfs_mount,
> + &init_securityfs_mount_count);
So ... it's less work for the kernel to skip the simple_pin_fs()
here, but it's more code, and more confusing code, to skip it.
So I just want to ask, to make sure: is it worth it? Or should
it just be done for all namespaces here (and below and for release),
for shorter, simpler, easier to read and grok code?
> + if (error)
> + return ERR_PTR(error);
> + }
>
> - if (!parent)
> - parent = mount->mnt_root;
> + if (!parent) {
> + if (ns == &init_user_ns)
> + parent = init_securityfs_mount->mnt_root;
> + else
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> + }
>
> dir = d_inode(parent);
>
> @@ -148,7 +191,7 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
> inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
> inode->i_private = data;
> if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
> - inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
> + inode->i_op = &securityfs_dir_inode_operations;
> inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
> inc_nlink(inode);
> inc_nlink(dir);
> @@ -156,6 +199,7 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
> inode->i_op = iops ? iops : &simple_symlink_inode_operations;
> inode->i_link = data;
> } else {
> + inode->i_op = &securityfs_file_inode_operations;
> inode->i_fop = fops;
> }
> d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
> @@ -167,7 +211,9 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
> dentry = ERR_PTR(error);
> out:
> inode_unlock(dir);
> - simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count);
> + if (ns == &init_user_ns)
> + simple_release_fs(&init_securityfs_mount,
> + &init_securityfs_mount_count);
> return dentry;
> }
>
> @@ -293,11 +339,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_create_symlink);
> */
> void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
> {
> + struct user_namespace *ns;
> struct inode *dir;
>
> if (!dentry || IS_ERR(dentry))
> return;
>
> + ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
> +
> dir = d_inode(dentry->d_parent);
> inode_lock(dir);
> if (simple_positive(dentry)) {
> @@ -310,7 +359,9 @@ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
> dput(dentry);
> }
> inode_unlock(dir);
> - simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count);
> + if (ns == &init_user_ns)
> + simple_release_fs(&init_securityfs_mount,
> + &init_securityfs_mount_count);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_remove);
>
> --
> 2.34.1
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