[PATCH v10 2/7] KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material

[Jason A. Donenfeld]

Hi Ahmad,

On Tue, May 17, 2022 at 07:52:51PM +0200, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> Hello Jason,
> 
> On 17.05.22 19:27, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> > On Fri, May 13, 2022 at 04:57:00PM +0200, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> >> +	trusted.rng=	[KEYS]
> >> +			Format: <string>
> >> +			The RNG used to generate key material for trusted keys.
> >> +			Can be one of:
> >> +			- "kernel"
> >> +			- the same value as trusted.source: "tpm" or "tee"
> >> +			- "default"
> >> +			If not specified, "default" is used. In this case,
> >> +			the RNG's choice is left to each individual trust source.
> >> +
> > 
> > As a general mechanism, I object to this. The kernel's RNG must be
> > trusted in the first place for key material. That's the whole point of
> > it.
> > 
> > However, it sounds like you're not proposing a general mechanism, but
> > just something particular to this "trusted keys" business.
> 
> The two currently upstream trust sources (trusted key backends) each provide
> their own RNG callback. This series adds a third backend that uses kernel RNG
> and additionally provides users of the two existing trust sources the option
> to benefit from kernel RNG as well.
> 
> > this should be a module flag, and thus not documented here, but rather
> > some place namespaced to your trusted keys stuff. "trusted_keys.preferred_rng={whatever}"
> 
> The trusted keys module is trusted.ko and directly before my added lines is
> the trusted.source=  documentation, so I think this is already at the correct place.

My apologies; I should have looked at the file itself instead of just
relying on git line context. You're right, the module itself is called
trusted.ko. This is confusing (shouldn't it be trusted_keys or
something?) , but what you propose sounds consistent from a namespacing
perspective with what's already there.

Jason