[PATCH 03/17] io_uring: add infra and support for IORING_OP_URING_CMD

[Casey Schaufler]

On 3/11/2022 9:11 AM, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 10, 2022 at 07:43:04PM -0700, Jens Axboe wrote:
>> On 3/10/22 6:51 PM, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
>>> On Tue, Mar 08, 2022 at 08:50:51PM +0530, Kanchan Joshi wrote:
>>>> From: Jens Axboe <axboe at kernel.dk>
>>>>
>>>> This is a file private kind of request. io_uring doesn't know what's
>>>> in this command type, it's for the file_operations->async_cmd()
>>>> handler to deal with.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe at kernel.dk>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Kanchan Joshi <joshi.k at samsung.com>
>>>> ---
>>> <-- snip -->
>>>
>>>> +static int io_uring_cmd(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	struct file *file = req->file;
>>>> +	int ret;
>>>> +	struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd = &req->uring_cmd;
>>>> +
>>>> +	ioucmd->flags |= issue_flags;
>>>> +	ret = file->f_op->async_cmd(ioucmd);
>>> I think we're going to have to add a security_file_async_cmd() check
>>> before this call here. Because otherwise we're enabling to, for
>>> example, bypass security_file_ioctl() for example using the new
>>> iouring-cmd interface.
>>>
>>> Or is this already thought out with the existing security_uring_*() stuff?
>> Unless the request sets .audit_skip, it'll be included already in terms
>> of logging.
> Neat.
>
>> But I'd prefer not to lodge this in with ioctls, unless
>> we're going to be doing actual ioctls.
> Oh sure, I have been an advocate to ensure folks don't conflate async_cmd
> with ioctl. However it *can* enable subsystems to enable ioctl
> passthrough, but each of those subsystems need to vet for this on their
> own terms. I'd hate to see / hear some LSM surprises later.
>
>> But definitely something to keep in mind and make sure that we're under
>> the right umbrella in terms of auditing and security.
> Paul, how about something like this for starters (and probably should
> be squashed into this series so its not a separate commit) ?
>
> >From f3ddbe822374cc1c7002bd795c1ae486d370cbd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof at kernel.org>
> Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2022 08:55:50 -0800
> Subject: [PATCH] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to for the new async_cmd file op
>
> io-uring is extending the struct file_operations to allow a new
> command which each subsystem can use to enable command passthrough.
> Add an LSM specific for the command passthrough which enables LSMs
> to inspect the command details.
>
> Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof at kernel.org>
> ---
>   fs/io_uring.c                 | 5 +++++
>   include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
>   include/linux/lsm_hooks.h     | 3 +++
>   include/linux/security.h      | 5 +++++
>   security/security.c           | 4 ++++
>   5 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c
> index 3f6eacc98e31..1c4e6b2cb61a 100644
> --- a/fs/io_uring.c
> +++ b/fs/io_uring.c
> @@ -4190,6 +4190,11 @@ static int io_uring_cmd_prep(struct io_kiocb *req,
>   	struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx;
>   	struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd = &req->uring_cmd;
>   	u32 ucmd_flags = READ_ONCE(sqe->uring_cmd_flags);
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	ret = security_uring_async_cmd(ioucmd);
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;
>   
>   	if (!req->file->f_op->async_cmd)
>   		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 819ec92dc2a8..4a20f8e6b295 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -404,4 +404,5 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_write, struct perf_event *event)
>   #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
>   LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new)
>   LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_async_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
>   #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 3bf5c658bc44..21b18cf138c2 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1569,6 +1569,9 @@
>    *      Check whether the current task is allowed to spawn a io_uring polling
>    *      thread (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL).
>    *
> + * @uring_async_cmd:
> + *      Check whether the file_operations async_cmd is allowed to run.
> + *
>    */
>   union security_list_options {
>   	#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) RET (*NAME)(__VA_ARGS__);
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 6d72772182c8..4d7f72813d75 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -2041,6 +2041,7 @@ static inline int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
>   #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>   extern int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new);
>   extern int security_uring_sqpoll(void);
> +extern int security_uring_async_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd);
>   #else
>   static inline int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
>   {
> @@ -2050,6 +2051,10 @@ static inline int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
>   {
>   	return 0;
>   }
> +static inline int security_uring_async_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
>   #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>   #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>   
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 22261d79f333..ef96be2f953a 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2640,4 +2640,8 @@ int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
>   {
>   	return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0);
>   }
> +int security_uring_async_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
> +{
> +	return call_int_hook(uring_async_cmd, 0, ioucmd);

I don't have a good understanding of what information is in ioucmd.
I am afraid that there may not be enough for a security module to
make appropriate decisions in all cases. I am especially concerned
about the modules that use path hooks, but based on the issues we've
always had with ioctl and the like I fear for all cases.

> +}
>   #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */