[PATCH v6 02/17] landlock: refactors landlock_find/insert_rule
Mickaël Salaün
mic at digikod.net
Fri Jul 8 13:59:24 UTC 2022
On 08/07/2022 15:10, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>
>
> 7/7/2022 7:44 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>
>> On 21/06/2022 10:22, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>> Adds a new object union to support a socket port
>>> rule type. Refactors landlock_insert_rule() and
>>> landlock_find_rule() to support coming network
>>> modifications. Now adding or searching a rule
>>> in a ruleset depends on a rule_type argument
>>> provided in refactored functions mentioned above.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze at huawei.com>
>>> ---
>>>
>>> Changes since v5:
>>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>>
>>> Changes since v4:
>>> * Refactors insert_rule() and create_rule() functions by deleting
>>> rule_type from their arguments list, it helps to reduce useless code.
>>>
>>> Changes since v3:
>>> * Splits commit.
>>> * Refactors landlock_insert_rule and landlock_find_rule functions.
>>> * Rename new_ruleset->root_inode.
>>>
>>> ---
>>> security/landlock/fs.c | 7 ++-
>>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 105 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 27 +++++-----
>>> 3 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
>>> index e6da08ed99d1..46aedc2a05a8 100644
>>> --- a/security/landlock/fs.c
>>> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
>>> @@ -173,7 +173,8 @@ int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct
>>> landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
>>> if (IS_ERR(object))
>>> return PTR_ERR(object);
>>> mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
>>> - err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, object, access_rights);
>>> + err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, object, 0, access_rights,
>>> + LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH);
>>> mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
>>> /*
>>> * No need to check for an error because landlock_insert_rule()
>>> @@ -204,7 +205,9 @@ find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const
>>> domain,
>>> inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
>>> rcu_read_lock();
>>> rule = landlock_find_rule(
>>> - domain, rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object));
>>> + domain,
>>> + (uintptr_t)rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object),
>>> + LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH);
>>> rcu_read_unlock();
>>> return rule;
>>> }
>>> diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
>>> index a3fd58d01f09..5f13f8a12aee 100644
>>> --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
>>> +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
>>> @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset
>>> *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
>>> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>>> refcount_set(&new_ruleset->usage, 1);
>>> mutex_init(&new_ruleset->lock);
>>> - new_ruleset->root = RB_ROOT;
>>> + new_ruleset->root_inode = RB_ROOT;
>>> new_ruleset->num_layers = num_layers;
>>> /*
>>> * hierarchy = NULL
>>> @@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ static void build_check_rule(void)
>>> }
>>>
>>> static struct landlock_rule *
>>> -create_rule(struct landlock_object *const object,
>>> +create_rule(struct landlock_object *const object_ptr,
>>> + const uintptr_t object_data,
>>> const struct landlock_layer (*const layers)[], const u32
>>> num_layers,
>>> const struct landlock_layer *const new_layer)
>>> {
>>> @@ -90,8 +91,15 @@ create_rule(struct landlock_object *const object,
>>> if (!new_rule)
>>> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>>> RB_CLEAR_NODE(&new_rule->node);
>>> - landlock_get_object(object);
>>> - new_rule->object = object;
>>> +
>>> + if (object_ptr) {
>>> + landlock_get_object(object_ptr);
>>> + new_rule->object.ptr = object_ptr;
>>> + } else if (object_ptr && object_data) {
>>
>> Something is wrong with this second check: else + object_ptr?
>
> Sorry. Do you mean logical error here? I got your point.
> You are right!
>
> I think it must be refactored like this:
>
> if (object_ptr && !object_data) {
> landlock_get_object(object_ptr);
> new_rule->object.ptr = object_ptr;
> } else if (object_ptr && object_data) {
> ...
> }
There is indeed a logical error but this doesn't fix everything. Please
include my previous suggestion instead.
> Plus, I will add a test for this case.
That would be great but I don't think this code is reachable from user
space. I think that would require kunit but I may be missing something.
How would you test this?
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