[PATCH v6 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area

[Dr. David Alan Gilbert]

* Peter Gonda (pgonda at google.com) wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 7, 2022 at 4:59 AM Borislav Petkov <bp at suse.de> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Jan 05, 2022 at 08:07:04PM +0000, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > > I thought I saw something in their patch series where they also had a
> > > secret that got passed down from EFI?
> >
> > Probably. I've seen so many TDX patchsets so that I'm completely
> > confused what is what.
> >
> > > As I remember they had it with an ioctl and something; but it felt to
> > > me if it would be great if it was shared.
> >
> > I guess we could try to share
> >
> > https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210154332.11526-28-brijesh.singh@amd.com
> >
> > for SNP and TDX.
> >
> > > I'd love to hear from those other cloud vendors; I've not been able to
> > > find any detail on how their SEV(-ES) systems actually work.
> >
> > Same here.
> >
> > > However, this aims to be just a comms mechanism to pass that secret;
> > > so it's pretty low down in the stack and is there for them to use -
> > > hopefully it's general enough.
> >
> > Exactly!
> >
> > > (An interesting question is what exactly gets passed in this key and
> > > what it means).
> > >
> > > All the contentious stuff I've seen seems to be further up the stack - like
> > > who does the attestation and where they get the secrets and how they
> > > know what a valid measurement looks like.
> >
> > It would be much much better if all the parties involved would sit down
> > and decide on a common scheme so that implementation can be shared but
> > getting everybody to agree is likely hard...
> 
> I saw a request for other cloud provider input here.

Thanks for the reply!

> A little
> background for our SEV VMs in GCE we rely on our vTPM for attestation,
> we do this because of SEV security properties quoting from AMD being
> to protect guests from a benign but vulnerable hypervisor. So a
> benign/compliant hypervisor's vTPM wouldn't lie to the guest. So we
> added a few bits in the PCRs to allow users to see their SEV status in
> vTPM quotes.

OK, so we're trying to protect from a malicious hypervisor - we don't
trust anything on the host (other than the CPU, and it's got to be
signing the attestation);  we don't think there's a way to do that with
a vTPM on plain SEV/SEV-ES

> It would be very interesting to offer an attestation solution that
> doesn't rely on our virtual TPM. But after reading through this cover
> letter and the linked OVMF patches I am confused what's the high level
> flow you are working towards? Are you loading in some OVMF using
> LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, getting the measurement with LAUNCH_MEASURE, then
> sending that to the customer who can then craft a "secret" (maybe say
> SSH key) for injection with LAUNCH_SECRET? Thats sounds good but there
> are a lot details left unattested there, how do you know you will boot
> from the image loaded with the PSP into a known state? Do you have
> some documentation I could read through to try and understand a little
> more and apologies if I missed it.

I'll defer to Dov's reply on that.

Dave

> >
> > --
> > Regards/Gruss,
> >     Boris.
> >
> > SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Ivo Totev, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
> >
> 
-- 
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert at redhat.com / Manchester, UK