[RFC PATCH 2/2] landlock: selftests for bind and connect hooks
Konstantin Meskhidze
konstantin.meskhidze at huawei.com
Tue Feb 8 03:01:34 UTC 2022
2/7/2022 3:49 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>
> On 07/02/2022 08:11, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>
>>
>> 2/1/2022 9:31 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>>
>>> On 24/01/2022 09:02, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>>> Support 4 tests for bind and connect networks actions:
>>>
>>> Good to see such tests!
>>>
>>>
>>>> 1. bind() a socket with no landlock restrictions.
>>>> 2. bind() sockets with landllock restrictions.
>
> [...]
>
>>>> + */
>>>> +
>>>> +#define _GNU_SOURCE
>>>> +#include <errno.h>
>>>> +#include <fcntl.h>
>>>> +#include <linux/landlock.h>
>>>> +#include <string.h>
>>>> +#include <sys/prctl.h>
>>>> +#include <sys/socket.h>
>>>> +#include <sys/types.h>
>>>> +#include <netinet/in.h>
>>>> +#include <arpa/inet.h>
>>>
>>> To make it determinisitic (and ease patching/diff/merging), you
>>> should sort all the included files (in tests and in the kernel code).
>>
>> Sorry. Did not get your point here. Could you explain in a bit more
>> details please.
>
> It will be easier to sort all the #include lines with the "sort -u"
> command.
Ok. I got it. Thanks.
>
> [...]
>
>>>> + /* Create a socket 3 */
>>>> + sockfd_3 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
>>>> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_3);
>>>> + /* Allow reuse of local addresses */
>>>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
>>>> &one, sizeof(one)));
>>>> +
>>>> + /* Set socket 3 address parameters */
>>>> + addr_3.sin_family = AF_INET;
>>>> + addr_3.sin_port = htons(SOCK_PORT_3);
>>>> + addr_3.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS);
>>>> + memset(&(addr_3.sin_zero), '\0', 8);
>>>> + /* Bind the socket 3 to IP address */
>>>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd_3, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_3,
>>>> sizeof(addr_3)));
>>>
>>> Why is it allowed to bind to SOCK_PORT_3 whereas net_service_3
>>> forbids it?
>>
>> It's allowed cause net_service_3 has empty access field.
>>
>> /* Empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) are ignored in network
>> * actions for SOCK_PORT_3 socket "object"
>> */
>> ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
>> LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
>> &net_service_3, 0));
>> ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);
>>
>> Applying this rule returns ENOMSG errno:
>>
>> /* Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules)
>> * are ignored in network actions
>> */
>> if (!net_service_attr.allowed_access) {
>> err = -ENOMSG;
>> goto out_put_ruleset;
>> }
>> This means binding socket 3 is not restricted.
>> For path_beneath_attr.allowed_access = 0 there is the same logic.
>
> I missed the ENOMSG check; the third rule has nothing to do with it.
> However, because the ruleset handles bind and connect actions, they must
> be denied by default. There is no rule allowing binding to SOCK_PORT_3.
> Why is it allowed?
>
> You can test with another SOCK_PORT_4, not covered by any rule. As for
> SOCK_PORT_3, it must be forbidden to bind on it.
Apllying the third rule (net_service_3.access is empty) returns ENOMSG
error. That means a process hasn't been restricted by the third rule,
cause during search process in network rb_tree the process won't find
the third rule, so binding to SOCK_PORT_3 is allowed.
Maybe there is a misunderstanding here. You mean that if there is just
only one network rule for a particular port has been applied to a
process, other ports' networks actions are automatically restricted
until they will be added into landlock newtwork rb_tree?
> .
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