[PATCH] KEYS: asymmetric: Make a copy of sig and digest in vmalloced stack

Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu at huaweicloud.com
Thu Dec 8 16:46:10 UTC 2022


From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>

Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear
mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the
linear mapping area.

However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced
stack support"), made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area,
which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs
adjacent pages.

Check if the signature and digest passed to public_key_verify_signature()
are in the linear mapping area and, for those which are not, make a copy in
the linear mapping area with kmalloc() and adjust the pointer passed to
sg_set_buf(). Reuse the existing kmalloc() and increase the allocation size
as needed.

Minimize the number of copies with the compile-time check of
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK and with the run-time check virt_addr_valid().

Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x
Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers at kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 2f8352e88860..307799ffbc3e 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -363,7 +363,8 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
 	struct scatterlist src_sg[2];
 	char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
 	char *key, *ptr;
-	int ret;
+	char *sig_s, *digest;
+	int ret, verif_bundle_len;
 
 	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
 
@@ -400,8 +401,21 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
 	if (!req)
 		goto error_free_tfm;
 
-	key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
-		      GFP_KERNEL);
+	verif_bundle_len = pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen;
+
+	sig_s = sig->s;
+	digest = sig->digest;
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
+		if (!virt_addr_valid(sig_s))
+			verif_bundle_len += sig->s_size;
+
+		if (!virt_addr_valid(digest))
+			verif_bundle_len += sig->digest_size;
+	}
+
+	/* key points to a buffer which could contain the sig and digest too. */
+	key = kmalloc(verif_bundle_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!key)
 		goto error_free_req;
 
@@ -424,9 +438,24 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
 			goto error_free_key;
 	}
 
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
+		ptr += pkey->paramlen;
+
+		if (!virt_addr_valid(sig_s)) {
+			sig_s = ptr;
+			memcpy(sig_s, sig->s, sig->s_size);
+			ptr += sig->s_size;
+		}
+
+		if (!virt_addr_valid(digest)) {
+			digest = ptr;
+			memcpy(digest, sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
+		}
+	}
+
 	sg_init_table(src_sg, 2);
-	sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size);
-	sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
+	sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig_s, sig->s_size);
+	sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], digest, sig->digest_size);
 	akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size,
 				   sig->digest_size);
 	crypto_init_wait(&cwait);
-- 
2.25.1



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