[PATCH v6 2/5] userfaultfd: add /dev/userfaultfd for fine grained access control
Axel Rasmussen
axelrasmussen at google.com
Thu Aug 18 17:22:27 UTC 2022
On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 11:32 PM Greg KH <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Aug 18, 2022 at 08:26:38AM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 02:47:25PM -0700, Axel Rasmussen wrote:
> > > +static int userfaultfd_dev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> > > +{
> > > + return 0;
> >
> > If your open does nothing, no need to list it here at all, right?
> >
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +static long userfaultfd_dev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long flags)
> > > +{
> > > + if (cmd != USERFAULTFD_IOC_NEW)
> > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > +
> > > + return new_userfaultfd(flags);
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +static const struct file_operations userfaultfd_dev_fops = {
> > > + .open = userfaultfd_dev_open,
> > > + .unlocked_ioctl = userfaultfd_dev_ioctl,
> > > + .compat_ioctl = userfaultfd_dev_ioctl,
> >
> > Why do you need to set compat_ioctl? Shouldn't it just default to the
> > existing one?
> >
> > And why is this a device node at all? Shouldn't the syscall handle all
> > of this (to be honest, I didn't read anything but the misc code, sorry.)
>
> Ah, read the documentation now. Seems you want to make it easier for
> people to get permissions on a system. Doesn't seem wise, but hey, it's
> not my feature...
Thanks for taking a look Greg!
WIth the syscall, the only way to get access to this feature is to
have CAP_SYS_PTRACE. Which gives you access to this, *plus* a bunch
more stuff.
My basic goal is to grant access to just this feature by itself, not
really just to make it easier to access. I think a device node is the
simplest way to achieve that (see the cover letter for considered
alternatives).
The other feedback looks like good simplification to me - I'll send
another version with those changes. I have to admit this is the first
time I've messed with misc device nodes, so apologies for being overly
explicit. :)
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
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