[PATCH v2 07/12] landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
Paul Moore
paul at paul-moore.com
Fri Apr 8 01:42:01 UTC 2022
On Tue, Mar 29, 2022 at 8:51 AM Mickaël Salaün <mic at digikod.net> wrote:
>
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic at linux.microsoft.com>
>
> Add a new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right to enable policy writers
> to allow sandboxed processes to link and rename files from and to a
> specific set of file hierarchies. This access right should be composed
> with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_* for the destination of a link or rename,
> and with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_* for a source of a rename. This
> lift a Landlock limitation that always denied changing the parent of an
> inode.
>
> Renaming or linking to the same directory is still always allowed,
> whatever LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER is used or not, because it is not
> considered a threat to user data.
>
> However, creating multiple links or renaming to a different parent
> directory may lead to privilege escalations if not handled properly.
> Indeed, we must be sure that the source doesn't gain more privileges by
> being accessible from the destination. This is handled by making sure
> that the source hierarchy (including the referenced file or directory
> itself) restricts at least as much the destination hierarchy. If it is
> not the case, an EXDEV error is returned, making it potentially possible
> for user space to copy the file hierarchy instead of moving or linking
> it.
>
> Instead of creating different access rights for the source and the
> destination, we choose to make it simple and consistent for users.
> Indeed, considering the previous constraint, it would be weird to
> require such destination access right to be also granted to the source
> (to make it a superset). Moreover, RENAME_EXCHANGE would also add to
> the confusion because of paths being both a source and a destination.
>
> See the provided documentation for additional details.
>
> New tests are provided with a following commit.
>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic at linux.microsoft.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220329125117.1393824-8-mic@digikod.net
> ---
>
> Changes since v1:
> * Update current_check_access_path() to efficiently handle
> RENAME_EXCHANGE thanks to the updated LSM hook (see previous patch).
> Only one path walk is performed per rename arguments until their
> common mount point is reached. Superset of access rights is correctly
> checked, including when exchanging a file with a directory. This
> requires to store another matrix of layer masks.
> * Reorder and rename check_access_path_dual() arguments in a more
> generic way: switch from src/dst to 1/2. This makes it easier to
> understand the RENAME_EXCHANGE cases alongs with the others. Update
> and improve check_access_path_dual() documentation accordingly.
> * Clean up the check_access_path_dual() loop: set both allowed_parent*
> when reaching internal filesystems and remove a useless one. This
> allows potential renames in internal filesystems (like for other
> operations).
> * Move the function arguments checks from BUILD_BUG_ON() to
> WARN_ON_ONCE() to avoid clang build error.
> * Rename is_superset() to no_more_access() and make it handle superset
> checks of source and destination for simple and exchange cases.
> * Move the layer_masks_child* creation from current_check_refer_path()
> to check_access_path_dual(): this is simpler and less error-prone,
> especially with RENAME_EXCHANGE.
> * Remove one optimization in current_check_refer_path() to make the code
> simpler, especially with the RENAME_EXCHANGE handling.
> * Remove overzealous WARN_ON_ONCE() for !access_request check in
> init_layer_masks().
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 27 +-
> security/landlock/fs.c | 607 ++++++++++++++++---
> security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +-
> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 2 +-
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 3 +-
> 6 files changed, 566 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
I'm still not going to claim that I'm a Landlock expert, but this
looks sane to me.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com>
> +static inline access_mask_t init_layer_masks(
> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
> + const access_mask_t access_request,
> + layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
> +{
> + access_mask_t handled_accesses = 0;
> + size_t layer_level;
> +
> + memset(layer_masks, 0, sizeof(*layer_masks));
> + /* An empty access request can happen because of O_WRONLY | O_RDWR. */
;)
--
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