[GIT PULL] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC)

[Mickaël Salaün]

On 05/04/2022 01:26, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 4, 2022 at 3:25 PM Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org> wrote:

[...]

> 
>> I think this already exists as AT_EACCESS? It was added with
>> faccessat2() itself, if I'm reading the history correctly.
> 
> Yeah, I noticed myself, I just hadn't looked (and I don't do enough
> user-space programming to be aware of if that way).

I think AT_EACCESS should be usable with the new EXECVE_OK too.


> 
>>>      (a) "what about suid bits that user space cannot react to"
>>
>> What do you mean here? Do you mean setid bits on the file itself?
> 
> Right.
> 
> Maybe we don't care.

I think we don't. I think the only corner case that could be different 
is for files that are executable, SUID and non-readable. In this case it 
wouldn't matter because userspace could not read the file, which is 
required for interpretation/execution. Anyway, S[GU]ID bits in scripts 
are just ignored by execve and we want to follow the same semantic.


> 
> Maybe we do.
> 
> Is the user-space loader going to honor them? Is it going to ignore
> them? I don't know. And it actually interacts with things like
> 'nosuid', which the kernel does know about, and user space has a hard
> time figuring out.
> 
> So if the point is "give me an interface so that I can do the same
> thing a kernel execve() loader would do", then those sgid/suid bits
> actually may be exactly the kind of thing that user space wants the
> kernel to react to - should it ignore them, or should it do something
> special when it sees that they are set?
> 
> I'm not saying that they *should* be something we care about. All I'm
> saying is that I want that *discussion* to happen.
> 
>                 Linus