[PATCH 00/18] bpf: Secure and authenticated preloading of eBPF programs

[Alexei Starovoitov]

On Mon, Apr 4, 2022 at 10:21 AM Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com> wrote:
>
> > From: Djalal Harouni [mailto:tixxdz at gmail.com]
> > Sent: Monday, April 4, 2022 9:45 AM
> > On Sun, Apr 3, 2022 at 5:42 PM KP Singh <kpsingh at kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Sat, Apr 2, 2022 at 1:55 AM Alexei Starovoitov
> > > <alexei.starovoitov at gmail.com> wrote:
> > ...
> > > >
> > > > > Pinning
> > > > > them to unreachable inodes intuitively looked the
> > > > > way to go for achieving the stated goal.
> > > >
> > > > We can consider inodes in bpffs that are not unlinkable by root
> > > > in the future, but certainly not for this use case.
> > >
> > > Can this not be already done by adding a BPF_LSM program to the
> > > inode_unlink LSM hook?
> > >
> >
> > Also, beside of the inode_unlink... and out of curiosity: making sysfs/bpffs/
> > readonly after pinning, then using bpf LSM hooks
> > sb_mount|remount|unmount...
> > family combining bpf() LSM hook... isn't this enough to:
> > 1. Restrict who can pin to bpffs without using a full MAC
> > 2. Restrict who can delete or unmount bpf filesystem
> >
> > ?
>
> I'm thinking to implement something like this.
>
> First, I add a new program flag called
> BPF_F_STOP_ONCONFIRM, which causes the ref count
> of the link to increase twice at creation time. In this way,
> user space cannot make the link disappear, unless a
> confirmation is explicitly sent via the bpf() system call.
>
> Another advantage is that other LSMs can decide
> whether or not they allow a program with this flag
> (in the bpf security hook).
>
> This would work regardless of the method used to
> load the eBPF program (user space or kernel space).
>
> Second, I extend the bpf() system call with a new
> subcommand, BPF_LINK_CONFIRM_STOP, which
> decreases the ref count for the link of the programs
> with the BPF_F_STOP_ONCONFIRM flag. I will also
> introduce a new security hook (something like
> security_link_confirm_stop), so that an LSM has the
> opportunity to deny the stop (the bpf security hook
> would not be sufficient to determine exactly for
> which link the confirmation is given, an LSM should
> be able to deny the stop for its own programs).
>
> What do you think?

Hack upon a hack? Makes no sense.