[GIT PULL] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC)
Linus Torvalds
torvalds at linux-foundation.org
Mon Apr 4 18:47:29 UTC 2022
On Mon, Apr 4, 2022 at 11:40 AM Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org> wrote:
>
> It looks like this didn't get pulled for -rc1 even though it was sent
> during the merge window and has been in -next for a while. It would be
> really nice to get this landed since userspace can't make any forward
> progress without the kernel support.
Honestly, I need a *lot* better reasoning for random new non-standard
system calls than this had.
And this kind of "completely random interface with no semantics except
for random 'future flags'" I will not pull even *with* good reasoning.
I already told Mickaël in private that I wouldn't pull this.
Honestly, we have a *horrible* history with non-standard system calls,
and that's been true even for well-designed stuff that actually
matters, that people asked for.
Something like this, which adds one very special system call and
where the whole thing is designed for "let's add something random
later because we don't even know what we want" is right out.
What the system call seems to actually *want* is basically a new flag
to access() (and faccessat()). One that is very close to what X_OK
already is.
But that wasn't how it was sold.
So no. No way will this ever get merged, and whoever came up with that
disgusting "trusted_for()" (for WHAT? WHO TRUSTS? WHY?) should look
themselves in the mirror.
If you add a new X_OK variant to access(), maybe that could fly.
Linus
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