[PATCH v29 04/28] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
Casey Schaufler
casey at schaufler-ca.com
Fri Sep 24 17:54:17 UTC 2021
Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
allow the user to specify an active securty module to apply
filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
security module to use for a particular rule.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity at vger.kernel.org
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 ++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 5c2798534950..fb2b66b3c1e7 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Description:
base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=]
[euid=] [fowner=] [fsname=]]
lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
- [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
+ [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=] [lsm=]]
option: [[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
[appraise_flag=] [appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
base:
@@ -122,6 +122,12 @@ Description:
measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
+ It is possible to explicitly specify which security
+ module a rule applies to using lsm=. If the security
+ modules specified is not active on the system the rule
+ will be rejected. If lsm= is not specified the first
+ security module registered on the system will be assumed.
+
Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index cbe6f1244e31..af278e225f9e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -82,9 +82,10 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
bool (*uid_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* Handlers for operators */
bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */
int pcr;
+ int which_lsm; /* which of the rules to use */
unsigned int allowed_algos; /* bitfield of allowed hash algorithms */
struct {
- void *rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]; /* LSM file metadata specific */
+ void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
char *args_p; /* audit value */
int type; /* audit type */
} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
@@ -96,17 +97,17 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
/**
* ima_lsm_isset - Is a rule set for any of the active security modules
- * @rules: The set of IMA rules to check
+ * @entry: the rule entry to examine
+ * @lsm_rule: the specific rule type in question
*
- * If a rule is set for any LSM return true, otherwise return false.
+ * If a rule is set return true, otherwise return false.
*/
-static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(void *rules[])
+static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, int lsm_rule)
{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
- if (rules[i])
- return true;
+ if (lsm_rule < 0 || lsm_rule > MAX_LSM_RULES)
+ return false;
+ if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
+ return true;
return false;
}
@@ -294,6 +295,20 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
+static int ima_rules_lsm __ro_after_init;
+
+static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
+{
+ ima_rules_lsm = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
+ if (ima_rules_lsm < 0) {
+ ima_rules_lsm = 0;
+ pr_err("rule lsm \"%s\" not registered", str);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
+
static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
{
struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
@@ -363,11 +378,10 @@ static void ima_free_rule_opt_list(struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list)
static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
int i;
- int r;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- for (r = 0; r < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; r++)
- ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rules[r]);
+ if (entry->lsm[i].rule)
+ ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
}
@@ -418,8 +432,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
- &nentry->lsm[i].rules[0]);
- if (!ima_lsm_isset(nentry->lsm[i].rules))
+ &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+ if (!ima_lsm_isset(nentry, i))
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
@@ -608,7 +622,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
int rc = 0;
u32 osid;
- if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules)) {
+ if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule, i)) {
if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
continue;
else
@@ -621,14 +635,14 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rules);
+ rule->lsm[i].rule);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rules);
+ rule->lsm[i].rule);
break;
default:
break;
@@ -1017,7 +1031,7 @@ enum {
Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
- Opt_label, Opt_err
+ Opt_lsm, Opt_label, Opt_err
};
static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -1056,6 +1070,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
{Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
{Opt_label, "label=%s"},
+ {Opt_lsm, "lsm=%s"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
@@ -1064,7 +1079,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
{
int result;
- if (ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules))
+ if (ima_lsm_isset(entry, lsm_rule))
return -EINVAL;
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
@@ -1074,8 +1089,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
- &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules[0]);
- if (!ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules)) {
+ &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
+ if (!ima_lsm_isset(entry, lsm_rule)) {
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
@@ -1680,6 +1695,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
&(template_desc->num_fields));
entry->template = template_desc;
break;
+ case Opt_lsm:
+ result = lsm_name_to_slot(args[0].from);
+ if (result == LSMBLOB_INVALID) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+ entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ entry->which_lsm = result;
+ result = 0;
+ break;
case Opt_err:
ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
result = -EINVAL;
@@ -1716,6 +1744,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
ssize_t result, len;
int audit_info = 0;
+ int i;
p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
len = strlen(p) + 1;
@@ -1733,6 +1762,9 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+ entry->which_lsm = ima_rules_lsm;
+
result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
if (result) {
ima_free_rule(entry);
@@ -1972,7 +2004,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
}
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- if (ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[i].rules)) {
+ if (ima_lsm_isset(entry, i)) {
switch (i) {
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
@@ -2014,6 +2046,9 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
+ if (entry->which_lsm >= 0)
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm),
+ lsm_slot_to_name(entry->which_lsm));
rcu_read_unlock();
seq_puts(m, "\n");
return 0;
--
2.31.1
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