[PATCH v6 12/13] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found
eric.snowberg at oracle.com
Fri Sep 17 02:00:54 UTC 2021
> On Sep 16, 2021, at 4:19 PM, Peter Jones <pjones at redhat.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 05:14:15PM -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>> + * Try to load the MokListTrustedRT UEFI variable to see if we should trust
>> + * the mok keys within the kernel. It is not an error if this variable
>> + * does not exist. If it does not exist, mok keys should not be trusted
>> + * within the machine keyring.
>> + */
>> +static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void)
>> + efi_status_t status;
>> + unsigned int mtrust = 0;
>> + unsigned long size = sizeof(mtrust);
>> + efi_guid_t guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
>> + u32 attr;
>> + status = efi.get_variable(L"MokListTrustedRT", &guid, &attr, &size, &mtrust);
> This should use efi_mokvar_entry_find("MokListTrustedRT") instead,
> similar to how load_moklist_certs() does. It's a *much* more reliable
> mechanism. We don't even need to fall back to checking for the
> variable, as any version of shim that populates this supports the config
> table method.
I’ll change this in v7, thanks.
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