[PATCH v6 00/13] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
nayna at linux.vnet.ibm.com
Thu Sep 16 20:03:33 UTC 2021
On 9/14/21 5:14 PM, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Back in 2013 Linus requested a feature to allow end-users to have the
> ability "to add their own keys and sign modules they trust". This was
> his *second* order outlined here . There have been many attempts
> over the years to solve this problem, all have been rejected. Many
> of the failed attempts loaded all preboot firmware keys into the kernel,
> including the Secure Boot keys. Many distributions carry one of these
> rejected attempts , , . This series tries to solve this problem
> with a solution that takes into account all the problems brought up in
> the previous attempts.
> On UEFI based systems, this series introduces a new Linux kernel keyring
> containing the Machine Owner Keys (MOK) called machine. It also defines
> a new MOK variable in shim. This variable allows the end-user to decide
> if they want to load MOK keys into the machine keyring. Mimi has suggested
> that only CA keys contained within the MOK be loaded into the machine
> keyring. All other certs will load into the platform keyring instead.
> By default, nothing changes; MOK keys are not loaded into the machine
> keyring. They are only loaded after the end-user makes the decision
> themselves. The end-user would set this through mokutil using a new
> --trust-mok option . This would work similar to how the kernel uses
> MOK variables to enable/disable signature validation as well as use/ignore
> the db. Any kernel operation that uses either the builtin or secondary
> trusted keys as a trust source shall also reference the new machine
> keyring as a trust source.
> Secure Boot keys will never be loaded into the machine keyring. They
> will always be loaded into the platform keyring. If an end-user wanted
> to load one, they would need to enroll it into the MOK.
> Steps required by the end user:
> Sign kernel module with user created key:
> $ /usr/src/kernels/$(uname -r)/scripts/sign-file sha512 \
> machine_signing_key.priv machine_signing_key.x509 my_module.ko
> Import the key into the MOK
> $ mokutil --import machine_signing_key.x509
> Setup the kernel to load MOK keys into the .machine keyring
> $ mokutil --trust-mok
> Then reboot, the MokManager will load and ask if you want to trust the
> MOK key and enroll the MOK into the MOKList. Afterwards the signed kernel
> module will load.
machine_signing_key.x509 appears to be a code-signing, self-signed key.
It's not a CA key, but the intent of the patchset is to load only CA
keys to .machine keyring.
Shouldn't there be two steps: one to load the CA key into MOK, and a
second one to load the code-signing key which is signed by this CA ?
Thanks & Regards,
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