[PATCH v3] integrity: support including firmware ".platform" keys at build time
Mimi Zohar
zohar at linux.ibm.com
Fri Oct 22 17:31:57 UTC 2021
On Tue, 2021-10-19 at 14:25 -0400, Nayna wrote:
> Gentle reminder for v3. Is this version good now for acceptance ?
>
> Thanks & Regards,
>
> - Nayna
>
> On 10/4/21 10:52 AM, Nayna Jain wrote:
> > Some firmware support secure boot by embedding static keys to verify the
> > Linux kernel during boot. However, these firmware do not expose an
> > interface for the kernel to load firmware keys onto ".platform" keyring.
> > This would prevent kernel signature verification on kexec.
> >
> > For these environments, a new function load_builtin_platform_cert() is
> > defined to load compiled in certificates onto the ".platform" keyring.
> >
> > load_certificate_list() is currently used for parsing compiled in
> > certificates to be loaded onto the .builtin or .blacklist keyrings.
> > Export load_certificate_list() allowing it to be used for parsing compiled
> > in ".platform" keyring certificates as well.
> >
> > Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp at intel.com>(auto build test ERROR)
> > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna at linux.ibm.com>
> > ---
> > NOTE: I am wondering if we should split this patch into two:
> > (https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/be4bd13d-659d-710d-08b9-1a34a65e5c5d@linux.vnet.ibm.com/).
> > I can do so if you also prefer the same.
Yes, splitting this patch would make it easier to review and upstream.
thanks,
Mimi
More information about the Linux-security-module-archive
mailing list