[PATCH v2] lockdown,selinux: avoid bogus SELinux lockdown permission checks
mpe at ellerman.id.au
Mon May 17 11:00:04 UTC 2021
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat.com> writes:
> Commit 59438b46471a ("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux
> lockdown") added an implementation of the locked_down LSM hook to
> SELinux, with the aim to restrict which domains are allowed to perform
> operations that would breach lockdown.
> However, in several places the security_locked_down() hook is called in
> situations where the current task isn't doing any action that would
> directly breach lockdown, leading to SELinux checks that are basically
> Since in most of these situations converting the callers such that
> security_locked_down() is called in a context where the current task
> would be meaningful for SELinux is impossible or very non-trivial (and
> could lead to TOCTOU issues for the classic Lockdown LSM
> implementation), fix this by modifying the hook to accept a struct cred
> pointer as argument, where NULL will be interpreted as a request for a
> "global", task-independent lockdown decision only. Then modify SELinux
> to ignore calls with cred == NULL.
> Since most callers will just want to pass current_cred() as the cred
> parameter, rename the hook to security_cred_locked_down() and provide
> the original security_locked_down() function as a simple wrapper around
> the new hook.
> The callers migrated to the new hook, passing NULL as cred:
> 1. arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c
> Here the hook seems to be called from non-task context and is only
> used for redacting some sensitive values from output sent to
It's hard to follow but it actually disables interactive use of xmon
entirely if lockdown is in confidentiality mode, and disables
modifications of the kernel in integrity mode.
But that's not really that important, the patch looks fine.
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe at ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
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