A missing check bug in __sys_accept4_file()
Paul Moore
paul at paul-moore.com
Wed May 12 16:23:36 UTC 2021
On Wed, May 12, 2021 at 3:43 AM Jinmeng Zhou <jjjinmeng.zhou at gmail.com> wrote:
> Dear maintainers,
>
> hi, our team has found and reported a missing check bug on Linux
> kernel v5.10.7 using static analysis.
> We are looking forward to having more experts' eyes on this. Thank you!
Creating a new socket, not associated with a connection (e.g. via
sock_create_lite()), is a different operation than creating a new
socket in response to an incoming connection as is done in
__sys_accept4_file(). This is why the sock_create_lite() uses the
security_socket_create() LSM hook and __sys_accept4_file() uses the
security_socket_accept() LSM hook.
> > On Fri, May 7, 2021 at 1:59 AM Jakub Kicinski <kuba at kernel.org> wrote:
> > > On Thu, 6 May 2021 15:44:36 +0800 Jinmeng Zhou wrote:
> > > hi, our team has found a missing check bug on Linux kernel v5.10.7 using static analysis. There is a path calls sock_alloc() after checking LSM function security_socket_create(), while another path calls it without checking.
> > > We think there is a missing check bug in __sys_accept4_file() before calling sock_alloc().
> >
> > Perhaps the semantics for listening sockets is that only the parent
> > sockets get the LSM check. Could you please circulate the report more
> > widely? I'd be good to have LSM experts' eyes on this at least.
> > CCing the mailing list should help get more opinions. Thank you!
> >
> > > Function sock_create_lite() uses security_socket_create() to check.
> > > 1. // check security_socket_create() ///////////////////////
> > > 2. int sock_create_lite(int family, int type, int protocol, struct socket **res)
> > > 3. {
> > > 4. int err;
> > > 5. struct socket *sock = NULL;
> > > 6. err = security_socket_create(family, type, protocol, 1);
> > > 7. if (err)
> > > 8. goto out;
> > > 9. sock = sock_alloc();
> > > 10. ...
> > > 11. }
> > >
> > > However, __sys_accept4_file() directly calls sock_alloc() without the security check.
> > > 1. // no check ////////////////////////////////////
> > > 2. int __sys_accept4_file(struct file *file, unsigned file_flags,
> > > 3. struct sockaddr __user *upeer_sockaddr,
> > > 4. int __user *upeer_addrlen, int flags,
> > > 5. unsigned long nofile)
> > > 6. {
> > > 7. struct socket *sock, *newsock;
> > > 8. struct file *newfile;
> > > 9. int err, len, newfd;
> > > 10. struct sockaddr_storage address;
> > > 11. if (flags & ~(SOCK_CLOEXEC | SOCK_NONBLOCK))
> > > 12. return -EINVAL;
> > > 13. if (SOCK_NONBLOCK != O_NONBLOCK && (flags & SOCK_NONBLOCK))
> > > 14. flags = (flags & ~SOCK_NONBLOCK) | O_NONBLOCK;
> > > 15. sock = sock_from_file(file, &err);
> > > 16. if (!sock)
> > > 17. goto out;
> > > 18. err = -ENFILE;
> > > 19. newsock = sock_alloc();
> > > 20. ...
> > > 21. }
> > >
> > > This no-check function can be reached through syscall.
> > > syscall => __sys_accept4 => __sys_accept4_file
> > >
> > > SYSCALL_DEFINE4(accept4, int, fd, struct sockaddr __user *, upeer_sockaddr,
> > > int __user *, upeer_addrlen, int, flags)
> > > {
> > > return __sys_accept4(fd, upeer_sockaddr, upeer_addrlen, flags);
> > > }
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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