[PATCH v4 08/11] evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata

Thu Mar 25 12:39:19 UTC 2021

> From: Christian Brauner [mailto:christian.brauner at ubuntu.com]
> Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2021 1:14 PM
> On Thu, Mar 25, 2021 at 10:53:43AM +0000, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > From: Roberto Sassu
> > > Sent: Friday, March 5, 2021 4:19 PM
> > > With the patch to allow xattr/attr operations if a portable signature
> > > verification fails, cp and tar can copy all xattrs/attrs so that at the
> > > end of the process verification succeeds.
> > >
> > > However, it might happen that the xattrs/attrs are already set to the
> > > correct value (taken at signing time) and signature verification succeeds
> > > before the copy has completed. For example, an archive might contains
> files
> > > owned by root and the archive is extracted by root.
> > >
> > > Then, since portable signatures are immutable, all subsequent
> operations
> > > fail (e.g. fchown()), even if the operation is legitimate (does not alter
> > > the current value).
> > >
> > > This patch avoids this problem by reporting successful operation to user
> > > space when that operation does not alter the current value of
> xattrs/attrs.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
> > > ---
> > >  security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 96
> > > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > >  1 file changed, 96 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > > b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > > index eab536fa260f..a07516dcb920 100644
> > > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > > @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
> > >  #include <linux/integrity.h>
> > >  #include <linux/evm.h>
> > >  #include <linux/magic.h>
> > > +#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
> > >
> > >  #include <crypto/hash.h>
> > >  #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
> > > @@ -328,6 +329,79 @@ static enum integrity_status
> > > evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
> > >  	return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
> > >  }
> > >
> > > +/*
> > > + * evm_xattr_acl_change - check if passed ACL changes the inode
> mode
> > > + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
> > > + * @xattr_name: requested xattr
> > > + * @xattr_value: requested xattr value
> > > + * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length
> > > + *
> > > + * Check if passed ACL changes the inode mode, which is protected by
> > > EVM.
> > > + *
> > > + * Returns 1 if passed ACL causes inode mode change, 0 otherwise.
> > > + */
> > > +static int evm_xattr_acl_change(struct dentry *dentry, const char
> > > *xattr_name,
> > > +				const void *xattr_value, size_t
> > > xattr_value_len)
> > > +{
> > > +	umode_t mode;
> > > +	struct posix_acl *acl = NULL, *acl_res;
> > > +	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> > > +	int rc;
> > > +
> > > +	/* UID/GID in ACL have been already converted from user to init ns
> > > */
> > > +	acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, xattr_value,
> > > xattr_value_len);
> > > +	if (!acl)
> >
> > Based on Mimi's review, I will change this to:
> >
> > if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acl))
> >
> > > +		return 1;
> > > +
> > > +	acl_res = acl;
> > > +	rc = posix_acl_update_mode(&init_user_ns, inode, &mode,
> > > &acl_res);
> >
> > About this part, probably it is not correct.
> >
> > I'm writing a test for this patch that checks if operations
> > that don't change the file mode succeed and those that
> > do fail.
> >
> > mount-idmapped --map-mount b:3001:0:1 /mnt /mnt-idmapped
> > pushd /mnt
> > echo "test" > test-file
> > chown 3001 test-file
> > chgrp 3001 test-file
> > chmod 2644 test-file
> > <check enabled>
> > setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:r test-file (expected to succeed, caller has
> CAP_FSETID, so S_ISGID is not dropped)
> > setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:rw test-file (expected to fail)
> > pushd /mnt-idmapped
> > capsh --drop=cap_fsetid -- -c setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r test-file (expected
> to succeed, caller is in the owning group of test-file, so S_ISGID is not
> dropped)
> >
> > After adding a debug line in posix_acl_update_mode():
> > printk("%s: %d(%d) %d\n", __func__,
> in_group_p(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)),
> __kgid_val(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)),
> capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID));
> >
> > without passing mnt_userns:
> > [  748.262582] setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:r test-file
> > [  748.268021] posix_acl_update_mode: 0(3001) 1
> > [  748.268035] posix_acl_update_mode: 0(3001) 1
> > [  748.268570] setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:rw test-file
> > [  748.274193] posix_acl_update_mode: 0(3001) 1
> > [  748.279198] capsh --drop=cap_fsetid -- -c setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r test-
> file
> > [  748.287894] posix_acl_update_mode: 0(3001) 0
> >
> > passing mnt_userns:
> > [   81.159766] setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:r test-file
> > [   81.165207] posix_acl_update_mode: 0(3001) 1
> > [   81.165226] posix_acl_update_mode: 0(3001) 1
> > [   81.165732] setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:rw test-file
> > [   81.170978] posix_acl_update_mode: 0(3001) 1
> > [   81.176014] capsh --drop=cap_fsetid -- -c setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r test-
> file
> > [   81.184648] posix_acl_update_mode: 1(0) 0
> > [   81.184663] posix_acl_update_mode: 1(0) 0
> >
> > The difference is that, by passing mnt_userns, the caller (root) is
> > in the owning group of the file (3001 -> 0). Without passing mnt_userns,
> > it is not (3001 -> 3001).
> >
> > Christian, Andreas, could you confirm that this is correct?
> 
> Hey Robert,
> 
> Thanks for the Cc and thanks for testing this with and without idmapped
> mounts; very much appreciated.
> 
> >
> > If there are no objections, I will send an additional patch to pass
> > mnt_userns to EVM.
> 
> Yes, since you're starting to verify attrs and posix_acl changes that
> deal with uids/gids you need to account for the mnt_userns. I've pulled
> and applied your patch locally and looked through it. I think you need
> to change:
> 
> - evm_inode_setxattr()
> - evm_inode_removexattr()
> 
> to take a mnt_userns. That should be straightforward. I already changed
> security_inode_setxattr() to pass down the mnt_userns so you need to
> simply pass that further down:
> 
> - security_inode_setxattr(mnt_userns, ...)
>   -> evm_inode_setxattr(mnt_userns, ...)
> 
> - security_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, ...)
>   -> evm_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, ...)

Hi Christian

yes, I changed both.

> The rest looks sane to me.
> 
> Fwiw, I'm mainting a large test-suite that I wrote for idmapped mounts
> but that aims to cover all vfs operations independent of them. It aims
> for:
> - test vfs feature x on regular mounts
> - test vfs feature on idmapped mounts
> - test vfs feature in user namespaces
> - test vfs feature on idmapped mount in user namespaces
> I'm in the process of upstreaming it for xfstests (cf. [1]). It also
> includes tests for xattrs/acls and fscaps. if ima and evm want to add
> something to this that'd be great but if you maintain your own testing
> that's of course totally ok.
> [1]: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/xfstests-
> dev.git/log/?h=idmapped_mounts

Yes, I think it would be good to have more tests and compare
IMA/EVM behavior between non and idmapped mounts.

For now, I wanted to be sure that my patch set works well
on top of your patches. Thanks a lot for reviewing this!

Roberto

HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Li Peng, Li Jian, Shi Yanli

> Thanks!
> Christian