[RFC PATCH 2/2] integrity: double check iint_cache was initialized

Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel at i-love.sakura.ne.jp
Wed Mar 24 11:20:39 UTC 2021


On 2021/03/24 20:10, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Wed, 2021-03-24 at 19:10 +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>> On 2021/03/24 1:13, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>> On Wed, 2021-03-24 at 00:14 +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>>>> On 2021/03/23 23:47, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>>>> Initially I also questioned making "integrity" an LSM.  Perhaps it's
>>>>> time to reconsider.   For now, it makes sense to just fix the NULL
>>>>> pointer dereferencing.
>>>>
>>>> Do we think calling panic() as "fix the NULL pointer dereferencing" ?
>>>
>>> Not supplying "integrity" as an "lsm=" option is a user error.  There
>>> are only two options - allow or deny the caller to proceed.   If the
>>> user is expecting the integrity subsystem to be properly working,
>>> returning a NULL and allowing the system to boot (RFC patch version)
>>> does not make sense.   Better to fail early.
>>
>> What does the "user" mean? Those who load the vmlinux?
>> Only the "root" user (so called administrators)?
>> Any users including other than "root" user?
>>
>> If the user means those who load the vmlinux, that user is explicitly asking
>> for disabling "integrity" for some reason. In that case, it is a bug if
>> booting with "integrity" disabled is impossible.
>>
>> If the user means something other than those who load the vmlinux,
>> is there a possibility that that user (especially non "root" users) is
>> allowed to try to use "integrity" ? If processes other than global init
>> process can try to use "integrity", wouldn't it be a DoS attack vector?
>> Please explain in the descripotion why calling panic() does not cause
>> DoS attack vector.
> 
> User in this case, is anyone rebooting the system and is intentionally
> changing the default values, dropping the "integrity" option on the
> boot command line.

OK. Then, I expect that the system boots instead of calling panic().
That user is explicitly asking for disabling "integrity" for some reason.



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