[PATCH v1 0/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys
horia.geanta at nxp.com
Sun Mar 21 20:01:10 UTC 2021
On 3/16/2021 7:02 PM, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP core
> built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
> Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique
> never-disclosed device-specific key. There has been multiple
> discussions on how to represent this within the kernel:
> - [RFC] crypto: caam - add red blobifier
> Steffen implemented a PoC sysfs driver to start a discussion on how to
> best integrate the blob mechanism.
> Mimi suggested that it could be used to implement trusted keys.
> Trusted keys back then were a TPM-only feature.
> - security/keys/secure_key: Adds the secure key support based on CAAM.
> Udit added a new "secure" key type with the CAAM as backend. The key
> material stays within the kernel only.
> Mimi and James agreed that this needs a generic interface, not specific
> to CAAM. Mimi suggested trusted keys. Jan noted that this could serve as
> basis for TEE-backed keys.
> - [RFC] drivers: crypto: caam: key: Add caam_tk key type
> Franck added a new "caam_tk" key type based on Udit's work. The key
> material stays within the kernel only, but can optionally be user-set
> instead of coming from RNG. James voiced the opinion that there should
> be just one user-facing generic wrap/unwrap key type with multiple
> possible handlers. David suggested trusted keys.
The whole point was to use caam "black blobs", with the main advantage of
keys being kept encrypted in memory after "unsealing" the blobs.
(Keys in blobs are encrypted with a persistent BKEK - blob KEK, derived from
fuse-based OTPMK. OTOH black keys are keys encrypted with an ephemeral, random
KEK that is stored in an internal caam register. When a black blob is unsealed,
the key is practically rekeyed, the random key replacing the BKEK; key is never
exposed in plaintext, rekeying happens in caam).
Current implementation uses "red blobs", which means keys are left unprotected
in memory after blobs are unsealed.
> - Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
> Sumit reworked trusted keys to support multiple possible backends with
> one chosen at boot time and added a new TEE backend along with TPM.
> This now sits in Jarkko's master branch to be sent out for v5.13
> This patch series builds on top of Sumit's rework to have the CAAM as yet another
> trusted key backend.
Shouldn't the description under TRUSTED_KEYS (in security/keys/Kconfig)
be updated to reflect the availability of multiple backends?
More information about the Linux-security-module-archive