[PATCH v30 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions

Kees Cook keescook at chromium.org
Fri Mar 19 18:45:38 UTC 2021

On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 09:42:44PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic at linux.microsoft.com>
> Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead
> to a privilege escalation.  Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker
> to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing
> malicious activities.  Thanks to  ptrace_may_access(), various part of
> the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee.
> A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process
> and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating
> processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a
> target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target
> process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer).
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris at namei.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic at linux.microsoft.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>

Kees Cook

More information about the Linux-security-module-archive mailing list