[PATCH v5 0/1] Unprivileged chroot
Mickaël Salaün
mic at digikod.net
Tue Mar 16 20:36:32 UTC 2021
Hi,
This new patch fix a race (spotted by Jann Horn) when reading
current->fs->users .
The chroot system call is currently limited to be used by processes with
the CAP_SYS_CHROOT capability. This protects against malicious
procesess willing to trick SUID-like binaries. The following patch
allows unprivileged users to safely use chroot(2), which may be
complementary to the use of user namespaces.
This patch is a follow-up of a previous one sent by Andy Lutomirski some
time ago:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0e2f0f54e19bff53a3739ecfddb4ffa9a6dbde4d.1327858005.git.luto@amacapital.net/
This patch can be applied on top of v5.12-rc3 . I would really
appreciate constructive reviews.
Previous versions:
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210316170135.226381-1-mic@digikod.net
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210311105242.874506-1-mic@digikod.net
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210310181857.401675-1-mic@digikod.net
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210310161000.382796-1-mic@digikod.net
Regards,
Mickaël Salaün (1):
fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
fs/open.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
base-commit: 1e28eed17697bcf343c6743f0028cc3b5dd88bf0
--
2.30.2
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