[PATCH v4 0/1] Unprivileged chroot

[Mickaël Salaün]

Hi,

This new patch group the current task security checks in a dedicated
helper current_chroot_allowed() and extend the patch description.

The chroot system call is currently limited to be used by processes with
the CAP_SYS_CHROOT capability.  This protects against malicious
procesess willing to trick SUID-like binaries.  The following patch
allows unprivileged users to safely use chroot(2), which may be
complementary to the use of user namespaces.

This patch is a follow-up of a previous one sent by Andy Lutomirski some
time ago:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0e2f0f54e19bff53a3739ecfddb4ffa9a6dbde4d.1327858005.git.luto@amacapital.net/

This patch can be applied on top of v5.12-rc3 .  I would really
appreciate constructive reviews.

Previous versions:
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210311105242.874506-1-mic@digikod.net
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210310181857.401675-1-mic@digikod.net
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210310161000.382796-1-mic@digikod.net

Regards,

Mickaël Salaün (1):
  fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)

 fs/open.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)


base-commit: 1e28eed17697bcf343c6743f0028cc3b5dd88bf0
-- 
2.30.2