[RFC PATCH 1/4] lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants

Paul Moore paul at paul-moore.com
Wed Mar 10 00:23:21 UTC 2021


On Mon, Mar 8, 2021 at 2:25 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb at redhat.com> wrote:
> On 2021-02-19 18:29, Paul Moore wrote:
> > Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM
> > hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security
> > credentials.  This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's
> > callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although
> > a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective
> > credentials.
> >
> > This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits
> > the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one
> > for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds.
> >
> >   void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
> >                                  u32 *secid);
> >   void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
> >                                 u32 *secid);
> >
> > While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct
> > variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to
> > ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for
> > both hooks.  The net effect is that this patch should not change
> > the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter
> > LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook
> > implementations and return the correct credentials.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com>
>
> Audit: Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb at redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb at redhat.com>

Thanks Richard, I added your review tag to the LSM, SELinux, and Smack patches.

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com



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