[PATCH] perf: Require CAP_KILL if sigtrap is requested
Marco Elver
elver at google.com
Wed Jun 30 09:37:09 UTC 2021
If perf_event_open() is called with another task as target and
perf_event_attr::sigtrap is set, and the target task's user does not
match the calling user, also require the CAP_KILL capability.
Otherwise, with the CAP_PERFMON capability alone it would be possible
for a user to send SIGTRAP signals via perf events to another user's
tasks. This could potentially result in those tasks being terminated if
they cannot handle SIGTRAP signals.
Fixes: 97ba62b27867 ("perf: Add support for SIGTRAP on perf events")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov at google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver at google.com>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 5 +++++
kernel/events/core.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 65efb74c3585..1c6be4743dbe 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -264,6 +264,11 @@ static inline bool bpf_capable(void)
return capable(CAP_BPF) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
}
+static inline bool kill_capable(void)
+{
+ return capable(CAP_KILL) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+}
+
static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
return ns_capable(ns, CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index fe88d6eea3c2..1ab4bc867531 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -12152,10 +12152,21 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
}
if (task) {
+ bool is_capable;
+
err = down_read_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
if (err)
goto err_file;
+ is_capable = perfmon_capable();
+ if (attr.sigtrap) {
+ /*
+ * perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other
+ * task. Require the current task to have CAP_KILL.
+ */
+ is_capable &= kill_capable();
+ }
+
/*
* Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
*
@@ -12165,7 +12176,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
* perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
*/
err = -EACCES;
- if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
+ if (!is_capable && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto err_cred;
}
--
2.32.0.93.g670b81a890-goog
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