[PATCH v8 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation
keescook at chromium.org
Tue Jun 8 23:19:31 UTC 2021
On Sat, Jun 05, 2021 at 05:03:57PM +0200, John Wood wrote:
> the kselftest to avoid the detection ;) ). So, in this version, to track
> all the statistical data (info related with application crashes), the
> extended attributes feature for the executable files are used. The xattr is
> also used to mark the executables as "not allowed" when an attack is
> detected. Then, the execve system call rely on this flag to avoid following
> executions of this file.
I have some concerns about this being actually usable and not creating
DoS situations. For example, let's say an attacker had found a hard-to-hit
bug in "sudo", and starts brute forcing it. When the brute LSM notices,
it'll make "sudo" unusable for the entire system, yes?
And a reboot won't fix it, either, IIUC.
It seems like there is a need to track "user" running "prog", and have
that be timed out. Are there use-cases here where that wouldn't be
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