[RFC PATCH v1 3/4] ubifs: auth: remove never hit key type error check
Ahmad Fatoum
a.fatoum at pengutronix.de
Thu Jul 22 09:18:01 UTC 2021
key_request accepts a key type as its first argument. If it returns a
valid pointer, it should always have this same requested key type.
Indeed other request_key users surveyed such as dm-crypt, ecryptfs
and fscrypt v1 also don't check the key type. Therefore drop the
apparently unneeded check.
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum at pengutronix.de>
---
To: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko at kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris at namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge at hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk at redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer at redhat.com>
To: dm-devel at redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song at kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard at nod.at>
Cc: linux-kernel at vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid at vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings at vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd at lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity at vger.kernel.org
---
fs/ubifs/auth.c | 6 ------
1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ubifs/auth.c b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
index e564d5ff8781..6a0b8d858d81 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/auth.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
@@ -286,12 +286,6 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
- if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) {
- ubifs_err(c, "key type must be logon");
- err = -ENOKEY;
- goto out;
- }
-
ukp = user_key_payload_locked(keyring_key);
if (!ukp) {
/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
--
git-series 0.9.1
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