[PATCH 1/3] crypto: mxs-dcp: Add support for hardware provided keys
Richard Weinberger
richard at nod.at
Wed Jul 14 10:39:43 UTC 2021
Ahmad,
----- Ursprüngliche Mail -----
> Von: "Ahmad Fatoum" <a.fatoum at pengutronix.de>
> Let's trade reviews to get the ball rolling?
Sounds like a fair deal. :-)
[...]
>> --- a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c
>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c
>> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
>> #include <linux/platform_device.h>
>> #include <linux/stmp_device.h>
>> #include <linux/clk.h>
>> +#include <linux/mxs-dcp.h>
>
> The CAAM specific headers are in <soc/fsl/*.h>.
> Should this be done likewise here as well?
I have no preferences. If soc/fsl/ is the way to go, fine by me.
[...]
>> @@ -219,15 +224,18 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx,
>> struct dcp *sdcp = global_sdcp;
>> struct dcp_dma_desc *desc = &sdcp->coh->desc[actx->chan];
>> struct dcp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
>> + dma_addr_t src_phys, dst_phys, key_phys = {0};
>
> Why = {0}; ? dma_addr_t is a scalar type and the value is always
> written here before access.
Initializing a scalar with {} is allowed in C, the braces are optional.
I like the braces because it works even when the underlaying type changes.
But that's just a matter of taste.
key_phys is initialized because it triggered a false positive gcc warning
on one of my targets. Let me re-run again to be sure, the code saw a lot of
refactoring since that.
[...]
>> +static int mxs_dcp_aes_setrefkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>> + unsigned int len)
>> +{
>> + struct dcp_async_ctx *actx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
>> + int ret = -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + if (len != DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE)
>> + goto out;
>
> Nitpick: there is no cleanup, so why not return -EINVAL here
> and unconditionally return 0 below?
What is the benefit?
Usually I try to use goto to have a single exit point of a function
but I don't have a strong preference...
>> +
>> + actx->key_len = len;
>> + actx->refkey = true;
>> +
>> + switch (key[0]) {
>> + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT0:
>> + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT1:
>> + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT2:
>> + case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT3:
>> + case DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE:
>> + case DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP:
>> + memcpy(actx->key, key, len);
>> + ret = 0;
>> + }
>
> In the error case you return -EINVAL below, but you still write
> into actx. Is that intentional?
You mean acts->key_len and actk->refkey?
Is this a problem?
Thanks,
//richard
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