[PATCH v3 2/2] perf: Refactor permissions check into perf_check_permission()

[Dmitry Vyukov]

On Mon, Jul 5, 2021 at 10:45 AM Marco Elver <elver at google.com> wrote:
>
> Refactor the permission check in perf_event_open() into a helper
> perf_check_permission(). This makes the permission check logic more
> readable (because we no longer have a negated disjunction). Add a
> comment mentioning the ptrace check also checks the uid.
>
> No functional change intended.
>
> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver at google.com>

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov at google.com>

> ---
> v3:
> * Introduce this patch to refactor the permissions checking logic to
>   make it more readable (reported by Eric W. Biederman).
> ---
>  kernel/events/core.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
>  1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> index f79ee82e644a..3008b986994b 100644
> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> @@ -11912,6 +11912,37 @@ __perf_event_ctx_lock_double(struct perf_event *group_leader,
>         return gctx;
>  }
>
> +static bool
> +perf_check_permission(struct perf_event_attr *attr, struct task_struct *task)
> +{
> +       unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS;
> +       bool is_capable = perfmon_capable();
> +
> +       if (attr->sigtrap) {
> +               /*
> +                * perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other task.
> +                * Require the current task to also have CAP_KILL.
> +                */
> +               rcu_read_lock();
> +               is_capable &= ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL);
> +               rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> +               /*
> +                * If the required capabilities aren't available, checks for
> +                * ptrace permissions: upgrade to ATTACH, since sending signals
> +                * can effectively change the target task.
> +                */
> +               ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS;
> +       }
> +
> +       /*
> +        * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility. The
> +        * ptrace check also includes checks that the current task and other
> +        * task have matching uids, and is therefore not done here explicitly.
> +        */
> +       return is_capable || ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode);
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * sys_perf_event_open - open a performance event, associate it to a task/cpu
>   *
> @@ -12152,43 +12183,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
>         }
>
>         if (task) {
> -               unsigned int ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS;
> -               bool is_capable;
> -
>                 err = down_read_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
>                 if (err)
>                         goto err_file;
>
> -               is_capable = perfmon_capable();
> -               if (attr.sigtrap) {
> -                       /*
> -                        * perf_event_attr::sigtrap sends signals to the other
> -                        * task. Require the current task to also have
> -                        * CAP_KILL.
> -                        */
> -                       rcu_read_lock();
> -                       is_capable &= ns_capable(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, CAP_KILL);
> -                       rcu_read_unlock();
> -
> -                       /*
> -                        * If the required capabilities aren't available, checks
> -                        * for ptrace permissions: upgrade to ATTACH, since
> -                        * sending signals can effectively change the target
> -                        * task.
> -                        */
> -                       ptrace_mode = PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS;
> -               }
> -
>                 /*
> -                * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
> -                *
>                  * We must hold exec_update_lock across this and any potential
>                  * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
>                  * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the
>                  * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
>                  */
>                 err = -EACCES;
> -               if (!is_capable && !ptrace_may_access(task, ptrace_mode))
> +               if (!perf_check_permission(&attr, task))
>                         goto err_cred;
>         }
>
> --
> 2.32.0.93.g670b81a890-goog
>