[PATCH v2] perf: Require CAP_KILL if sigtrap is requested
elver at google.com
Fri Jul 2 07:20:56 UTC 2021
On Thu, 1 Jul 2021 at 23:41, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm at xmission.com> wrote:
> Marco Elver <elver at google.com> writes:
> > If perf_event_open() is called with another task as target and
> > perf_event_attr::sigtrap is set, and the target task's user does not
> > match the calling user, also require the CAP_KILL capability.
> > Otherwise, with the CAP_PERFMON capability alone it would be possible
> > for a user to send SIGTRAP signals via perf events to another user's
> > tasks. This could potentially result in those tasks being terminated if
> > they cannot handle SIGTRAP signals.
> > Note: The check complements the existing capability check, but is not
> > supposed to supersede the ptrace_may_access() check. At a high level we
> > now have:
> > capable of CAP_PERFMON and (CAP_KILL if sigtrap)
> > OR
> > ptrace_may_access() // also checks for same thread-group and uid
> Is there anyway we could have a comment that makes the required
> capability checks clear?
> Basically I see an inlined version of kill_ok_by_cred being implemented
> without the comments on why the various pieces make sense.
I'll add more comments. It probably also makes sense to factor the
code here into its own helper.
> Certainly ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS) should not
> be a check to allow writing/changing a task. It needs to be
> PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS, like /proc/self/mem uses.
So if attr.sigtrap the checked ptrace mode needs to switch to
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS. Otherwise, it is possible to send a
signal if only read-ptrace permissions are granted.
Is my assumption here correct?
> Now in practice I think your patch probably has the proper checks in
> place for sending a signal but it is far from clear.
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