[PATCH 2/2] security.capability: fix conversions on getxattr

Eric W. Biederman ebiederm at xmission.com
Fri Jan 29 22:55:29 UTC 2021

"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge at hallyn.com> writes:

> On Thu, Jan 28, 2021 at 02:19:13PM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge at hallyn.com> writes:
>> > On Tue, Jan 19, 2021 at 07:34:49PM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> >> Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi at redhat.com> writes:
>> >> 
>> >> > If a capability is stored on disk in v2 format cap_inode_getsecurity() will
>> >> > currently return in v2 format unconditionally.
>> >> >
>> >> > This is wrong: v2 cap should be equivalent to a v3 cap with zero rootid,
>> >> > and so the same conversions performed on it.
>> >> >
>> >> > If the rootid cannot be mapped v3 is returned unconverted.  Fix this so
>> >> > that both v2 and v3 return -EOVERFLOW if the rootid (or the owner of the fs
>> >> > user namespace in case of v2) cannot be mapped in the current user
>> >> > namespace.
>> >> 
>> >> This looks like a good cleanup.
>> >
>> > Sorry, I'm not following.  Why is this a good cleanup?  Why should
>> > the xattr be shown as faked v3 in this case?
>> If the reader is in &init_user_ns.  If the filesystem was mounted in a
>> user namespace.   Then the reader looses the information that the
> Can you be more precise about "filesystem was mounted in a user namespace"?
> Is this a FUSE thing, the fs is marked as being mounted in a non-init userns?
> If that's a possible case, then yes that must be represented as v3.  Using
> is_v2header() may be the simpler way to check for that, but the more accurate
> check would be "is it v2 header and mounted by init_user_ns".

I think the filesystems current relevant are fuse,overlayfs,ramfs,tmpfs.

> Basically yes, in as many cases as possible we want to just give a v2
> cap because more userspace knows what to do with that, but a non-init-userns
> mounted fs which provides a v2 fscap should have it represented as v3 cap
> with rootid being the kuid that owns the userns.

That is the case we that is being fixed in the patch.

> Or am I still thinking wrongly?  Wouldn't be entirely surprised :)

No you got it.


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