[PATCH v3 09/10] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
jarkko at kernel.org
Wed Jan 20 05:23:09 UTC 2021
On Thu, Jan 14, 2021 at 04:19:08PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic at linux.microsoft.com>
> Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user
> to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to
> invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or
> from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to
> add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.
> Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been
> trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the
> blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and
> vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a
> key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be
> provided as the key payload.
> Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system
> is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.
> Update blacklist keyring and blacklist key access rights:
> * allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which
> make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
> * forbids key update;
> * restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the
> root user rights.
> See the help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh provided by a
> following commit.
Please re-order patches in a way that print-cert-tbs-hash.sh is
available before this. That way we get rid of this useless remark.
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2 at infradead.org>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic at linux.microsoft.com>
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