[PATCH] RTIC: selinux: ARM64: Move selinux_state to a separate page

Marc Zyngier maz at kernel.org
Mon Feb 22 10:56:57 UTC 2021

On Mon, 22 Feb 2021 04:58:41 +0000,
pnagar at codeaurora.org wrote:
> On 2021-02-17 15:45, Marc Zyngier wrote:


> > +1 on that. Even if, as I suspect, this is targeting some unspecified
> > hypervisor that is not KVM, the first course of action should be for
> > this to be implemented in the kernel's own hypervisor first so that
> > anyone can review understand what is at play.
> > 
> > Thanks,
> > 
> >          M.
> Thank you for your comments. The key value add of the feature is a
> third party independent entity keeping a watch on crucial kernel
> assets, such that in case the kernel itself is compromised, still,
> the protection can remain intact.  Can this be achieved if the
> implementation is done in KVM? I've limited knowledge of KVM
> currently, can surely look into more details for a better
> understanding.


KVM/arm64 doesn't currently support Stage-2 mappings on the host side,
but there are patches[1] on the list that implement this
functionality, and that I'm hoping to get in 5.13 (no pressure,
Quentin... ;-).

This could also be implemented with the current KVM code though, as a
PV service to guests, and I'd suggest looking into that as an initial



[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108121524.656872-1-qperret@google.com

Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.

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