[PATCH v2 3/3] security: Add LSMs dependencies to CONFIG_LSM
masahiroy at kernel.org
Sun Feb 21 08:50:30 UTC 2021
On Tue, Feb 16, 2021 at 4:03 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 15, 2021 at 7:17 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic at digikod.net> wrote:
> > From: Mickaël Salaün <mic at linux.microsoft.com>
> > Thanks to the previous commit, this gives the opportunity to users, when
> > running make oldconfig, to update the list of enabled LSMs at boot time
> > if an LSM has just been enabled or disabled in the build. Moreover,
> > this list only makes sense if at least one LSM is enabled.
> > Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com>
> > Cc: James Morris <jmorris at namei.org>
> > Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy at kernel.org>
> > Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge at hallyn.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic at linux.microsoft.com>
> > Link: https://firstname.lastname@example.org
> > ---
> > Changes since v1:
> > * Add CONFIG_SECURITY as a dependency of CONFIG_LSM. This prevent an
> > error when building without any LSMs.
> > ---
> > security/Kconfig | 4 ++++
> > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> > index 7561f6f99f1d..addcc1c04701 100644
> > --- a/security/Kconfig
> > +++ b/security/Kconfig
> > @@ -277,6 +277,10 @@ endchoice
> > config LSM
> > string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
> > + depends on SECURITY || SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM || SECURITY_YAMA || \
> > + SECURITY_LOADPIN || SECURITY_SAFESETID || INTEGRITY || \
> > + SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK || SECURITY_TOMOYO || \
> > + SECURITY_APPARMOR || BPF_LSM
> This looks really awkward, since all of these already depend on
> SECURITY (if not, it's a bug)... I guarantee you that after some time
> someone will come, see that the weird boolean expression is equivalent
> to just SECURITY, and simplify it.
Currently, LSM does not depend on SECURITY.
So you can always define LSM irrespective of SECURITY,
which seems a bug.
So, I agree with adding 'depends on SECURITY'.
What he is trying to achieve in this series
seems wrong, of course.
> I assume the new mechanism wouldn't work as intended if there is just
> SECURITY? If not, then maybe you should rather specify this value
> dependency via some new field rather than abusing "depends on" (say,
> "value depends on"?). The fact that a seemingly innocent change to the
> config definition breaks your mechanism suggests that the design is
> I do think this would be a useful feature, but IMHO shouldn't be
> implemented like this.
> > default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
> > default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
> > default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
> > --
> > 2.30.0
> Ondrej Mosnacek
> Software Engineer, Linux Security - SELinux kernel
> Red Hat, Inc.
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