[RFC PATCH v2 8/9] selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls
Paul Moore
paul at paul-moore.com
Wed Aug 11 20:49:01 UTC 2021
WARNING - This is a work in progress, this patch, including the
description, may be incomplete or even incorrect. You have been
warned.
This patch implements two new io_uring access controls, specifically
support for controlling the io_uring "personalities" and
IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL. Controlling the sharing of io_urings themselves
is handled via the normal file/inode labeling and sharing mechanisms.
The io_uring { override_creds } permission restricts which domains
the subject domain can use to override it's own credentials.
Granting a domain the io_uring { override_creds } permission allows
it to impersonate another domain in io_uring operations.
The io_uring { sqpoll } permission restricts which domains can create
asynchronous io_uring polling threads. This is important from a
security perspective as operations queued by this asynchronous thread
inherit the credentials of the thread creator by default; if an
io_uring is shared across process/domain boundaries this could result
in one domain impersonating another. Controlling the creation of
sqpoll threads, and the sharing of io_urings across processes, allow
policy authors to restrict the ability of one domain to impersonate
another via io_uring.
As a quick summary, this patch adds a new object class with two
permissions:
io_uring { override_creds sqpoll }
These permissions can be seen in the two simple policy statements
below:
allow domA_t domB_t : io_uring { override_creds };
allow domA_t self : io_uring { sqpoll };
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com>
---
v2:
- made the selinux_uring_* funcs static
- removed the debugging code
v1:
- initial draft
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 36 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b0032c42333e..1fb0c76deff2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7105,6 +7105,35 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
+ * @new: the target creds
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
+ * to service an io_uring operation.
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), cred_sid(new),
+ SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
+ * kernel polling thread.
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
+{
+ int sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid,
+ SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
/*
* IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
* 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
@@ -7343,6 +7372,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
+#endif
+
LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, selinux_lockdown),
/*
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 62d19bccf3de..3314ad72279d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -252,6 +252,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "integrity", "confidentiality", NULL } },
{ "anon_inode",
{ COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "io_uring",
+ { "override_creds", "sqpoll", NULL } },
{ NULL }
};
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