[PATCH 2/4] KEYS: trusted: allow trust sources to use kernel RNG for key material

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Mon, Aug 09, 2021 at 09:52:20AM +0200, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> Hello Sumit,
> 
> On 22.07.21 08:31, Sumit Garg wrote:
> > On Wed, 21 Jul 2021 at 22:19, Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum at pengutronix.de> wrote:
> >>
> >> The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG,
> >> but instead let the hardware that does the sealing/unsealing also
> >> generate the random key material. While a previous change offers users
> >> the choice to use the kernel RNG instead for both, new trust sources
> >> may want to unconditionally use the kernel RNG for generating key
> >> material, like it's done elsewhere in the kernel.
> >>
> >> This is especially prudent for hardware that has proven-in-production
> >> HWRNG drivers implemented, as otherwise code would have to be duplicated
> >> only to arrive at a possibly worse result.
> >>
> >> Make this possible by turning struct trusted_key_ops::get_random
> >> into an optional member. If a driver leaves it NULL, kernel RNG
> >> will be used instead.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum at pengutronix.de>
> >> ---
> >> To: James Bottomley <jejb at linux.ibm.com>
> >> To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko at kernel.org>
> >> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.ibm.com>
> >> To: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
> >> Cc: James Morris <jmorris at namei.org>
> >> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge at hallyn.com>
> >> Cc: "Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta at nxp.com>
> >> Cc: Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier at nxp.com>
> >> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert at gondor.apana.org.au>
> >> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem at davemloft.net>
> >> Cc: Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal at nxp.com>
> >> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers at kernel.org>
> >> Cc: Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe at pengutronix.de>
> >> Cc: David Gstir <david at sigma-star.at>
> >> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard at nod.at>
> >> Cc: Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand at nxp.com>
> >> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg at linaro.org>
> >> Cc: keyrings at vger.kernel.org
> >> Cc: linux-crypto at vger.kernel.org
> >> Cc: linux-integrity at vger.kernel.org
> >> Cc: linux-kernel at vger.kernel.org
> >> Cc: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org
> >> ---
> >>  include/keys/trusted-type.h               | 2 +-
> >>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 2 +-
> >>  2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> >> index d89fa2579ac0..4eb64548a74f 100644
> >> --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> >> +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> >> @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ struct trusted_key_ops {
> >>         /* Unseal a key. */
> >>         int (*unseal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob);
> >>
> >> -       /* Get a randomized key. */
> >> +       /* Optional: Get a randomized key. */
> >>         int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len);
> >>
> >>         /* Exit key interface. */
> >> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> >> index 569af9af8df0..d2b7626cde8b 100644
> >> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> >> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> >> @@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
> >>                         continue;
> >>
> >>                 get_random = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random;
> >> -               if (trusted_kernel_rng)
> >> +               if (trusted_kernel_rng || !get_random)
> >>                         get_random = kernel_get_random;
> >>
> > 
> > For ease of understanding, I would prefer to write it as:
> > 
> >                   get_random = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random ?:
> >                                          kernel_get_random;
> >                   if (trusted_kernel_rng)
> >                         get_random = kernel_get_random;
> > 
> > With that:
> > 
> > Acked-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg at linaro.org>
> 
> I don't think it improves readability to split up the conditional.
> At least I need to take a second pass over the code to understand
> the second conditional.

Ternary operators are pain to read, unless a super trivial case.

I'd stick to what you did.

/Jarkko