[PATCH RFC v2 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK

Mimi Zohar zohar at linux.ibm.com
Tue Aug 3 17:01:24 UTC 2021

Hi Eric,

On Mon, 2021-07-26 at 13:13 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:

> When the kernel boots, if MokListTrustedRT is set and
> EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE is not set, the MokListRT is loaded into the
> mok keyring instead of the platform keyring. Mimi has suggested that
> only CA keys or keys that can be vouched for by other kernel keys be
> loaded into this keyring. All other certs will load into the platform
> keyring instead.

I suggested only loading the CA keys stored in the MOK db onto the MOK
keyring.  Like the builtin trusted keyring, the MOK keyring would also
be linked to the secondary keyring.   Assuming the secondary keyring is
defined, all other properly signed MOK db keys  - signed by keys on the
builtin, secondary or MOK keyring - would be loaded onto the secondary

As previously discussed, this might require reading the MOK db twice -
once to load the CA keys on the MOK keyring, a second time to load the
remaining properly signed keys onto the secondary keyring.



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